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Forgetting Lochner in the Journey from Plan
to Market: The Framing Effect of the Market
Rhetoric in Market-Oriented Reforms
JOEL M. NGUGIf
INTRODUCTION
In 1998, Professor Julie Cohen warned that Lochnerism
had resurrected in stunning fashion in the digital frontier.1
Professor Cohen was referring not to a string of Supreme
Court decisions citing Lochner v. New York 2 favorably, but
to a pattern of thinking about the relationship between
economic rights and their limits in the political economy on
the one hand, and the relative institutional competence of
the branches of government to define the extent of those
rights.3 As she puts it, "Lochner represented a particular
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. S.J.D.,
L.L.M, Harvard Law School; L.L.B, University of Nairobi, Kenya.
1. Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of
"Rights Management," 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 464 (1998).
2. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court shot down, as
unconstitutional, maximum employment hours legislation on the grounds that
the legislation impermissibly interfered with the ability of individuals to enter
into an employment contract freely. Id.
3. Lochner became an epithet used to characterize a narrow and rigid way of
interpreting the powers of the state to regulate the market for social welfare
purposes vis-A-vis the rights of individuals to contract freely. By the time the
"reign" of Lochner was ended by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937), the U.S. Supreme Court had struck down almost two hundred
legislations aimed at regulating the market and protecting the social welfare.
West Coast Hotel, therefore, effectively held that individuals were not entitled to
an unregulated market-a supposition that Lochner stood for given its
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ideal of social ordering, premised on a seamless convergence
of the private-law institutions of property and contract to
provide a zone of legal insulation for market outcomes."4
While this vision of the political economy and the market
has given way due to evidence of pervasive market failures
in the "real world," Professor Cohen warned that "cyber-
economists" and government technocrats were using this
same vision in making recommendations about the
(de)regulation of the digital world. 5 As Professor James
Boyle similarly argued, it became possible to make these
Lochnerian arguments in cyberspace because participants
in the digital (de)regulation discourse sought to label their
discourse as "technical"-offering a neutral basis for
devising "technocratic" rules for facilitating private
choices.6 Hence, the move to characterize the issues arising
from cyberspace ownership and regulation as technocratic
(rather than political) served the important discursive
function of "forgetting" or obscuring the lessons of Lochner in
determining the appropriate regime for regulating cyberspace.
In this Article, I sound a warning that this same
Lochnerism is alive, well, and kicking in the "Development
Frontier. ' 7 I argue that a discursive move quite similar to
that described by Professors Cohen and Boyle respecting
the digital frontier is at play in the field of Law and
Development. In this move, I argue, settled "lessons" about
the role of and interaction between the state and the
market are obscured and "forgotten" in the service of a
doctrinaire form of a "Market approach" to economic
development. Such an approach, I argue, simply reenacts
abroad, in the developing world, a Lochnerian economic
vision. As in the digital frontier, this discursive move is
expansive interpretation of freedom of contract. In U.S. constitutional
jurisprudence, Lochnerism is derided almost unanimously. It is generally
accepted that its interpretation of state powers vis-A-vis individuals' rights to
contract freely was narrow and lopsided.
4. Cohen, supra note 1, at 465.
5. Id. at 464-65.
6. James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and
Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177, 205 (1997).
7. "Development Frontier" can be loosely understood as the multi-
disciplinary field that targets economies generally described as "under-
developed," "least-developed," or "less-developed" with the objective of making
them "more developed" through economic growth. For the origins of the field,
see infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
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obfuscated by labeling the discourse producing it as
"technocratic" rather than "political" or even "legal" regime
to which many valid but differing perspectives and interests
can appropriately clash. Constructing the "Market" discourse
as "technocratic" presents it as neutral and objective-one
which merely shapes or even actively facilitates individual's
choices-rather than coerce them into any particular legal
relations.8 Thus, while the content and meaning of the
"Market" as a concept is primarily contested in many
disciplines, it is particularly interesting that it seems to
evoke an implicit consensus as to its meaning and content
in Law and Development discourses. 9 Hence, international
legal scholars, economists, political economists, and
development technocrats often take for granted what they
mean by "Market" when they talk of "Market-oriented"
reforms in developing countries. 10
8. See Boyle, supra note 6, at 177.
9. By "Law and Development discourses" I am referring to the debates,
scholarly writings, and interventions among international legal scholars,
development technocrats, international development agencies, development
economists, and other professionals interested in economic development about
the role of law in facilitating economic development. As a distinct discourse,
Trubek and Galanter trace its origins in the 1960s. David M. Trubek & Marc
Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflection on the Crisis in Law
and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062. After a
brief hiatus, the "Law and Development Movement" (LDM) powerfully
reemerged in the late 1980s, spurred by the fall of communism and the
concomitant discourses extolling the virtues of the Market and capitalist
development. Carol Rose and Thomas Carothers have two interesting, if
competing versions of this "revival" of the LDM. Carol V. Rose, The "New" Law
and Development Movement in the Post-Cold War Era: A Vietnam Case Study,
32 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 93 (1998); Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77
FOREIGN AFF. 95 (1998). The World Bank states that it has funded more than
600 legal reform projects in developing countries in the 1990s. These projects
range from US$190,000 to US$252.5 million. WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN LEGAL
AND JUDICIAL REFORM (2004), available at http://go.worldbank.org/DVVH5FFLP0.
10. See, e.g., Jeswald W. Salacuse, From Developing Countries to Emerging
Markets: A Changing Role for Law in the Third World, 33 INT'L LAW. 875, 883-
84 (1999) (arguing that many developing nations have embraced evolving
models to reach developmental goals since the 1980s).
[By the mid-1980s] powerful external forces were insisting upon
fundamental changes in Third World economic policies, often as a
condition to financial and developmental assistance. The World Bank,
the International Monetary Fund, western bilateral aid agencies, and
international commercial banks advocated a set of new policies, known
as the "Washington Consensus," which required the elimination of
budget deficits, strict control of the money supply, privatization of
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This Article considers the impact that the Market, as a
concept, has played in organizing reality, and facilitating
different policy prescriptions in Market-oriented legal
reforms in developing countries. The argument is not that
the concept of the Market has in fact commanded a
consensus as to its meaning in Law and Development
discourses. Rather, despite lack of such consensus, the
Market as a conceptual tool, has nonetheless inspired legal
reforms and economic policies and has been used to shape
and influence available policy prescriptions in developing
countries in ways that simultaneously presuppose such a
consensus as to its meaning and content, yet espouse wildly
varying prescriptions at the same time.
This Article will trace how the construction of the
'Market" organizes ways of thinking about international
relations, the role of the government in economic life, and
the role of law and legal institutions in economic
development and economic thought. Thus, I propose an
understanding of the Market as a legal and social construct.
As we will see, this understanding allows us to see the
Market as a category that justifies and legitimates a wide
array of policy prescriptions and interventions. These
interventions are, at times, at odds with each other.
However, the construction of the Market comprehends them
all to produce profoundly stable, albeit incoherent, m~lange
of policy preferences.
I will develop a theoretical framework that attempts to
explain the idea of the Market in this mode, and its
practical consequences and manifestations in international
development discourse, especially in Market-oriented legal,
political and economic reforms.11 I will explore how this
mode of understanding the idea of the Market operates as a
stable construct with the power to both prescribe a desired
society and simultaneously legitimate that society. I will
also use this mode of understanding to explain how this
construction of the Market creates, manages (and polices)
state-owned enterprises, and an openness to international trade and
investment. Together, these policies represented a new model of
development.
Id. at 883.
11. In this Article I use the terms "Law and Development discourse," and
"International Development discourse" as synonymous and interchangeable. See
supra note 9 (describing "Law and Development discourses").
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the binary provinces of the Market and the state, in
different places, and at different times prescribing different
roles for each in opposition to the other.
I will then use this mode of understanding of the
Market to explain one way to interpret the apparent
solidification of the Market approach to development (read:
neo-liberalism) in the "long decade of the 1980s"12 and the
flurry of Market-oriented reforms it unleashed in non-
Western countries. 13 This mode of understanding reads the
Market-oriented reforms as an institutional response to the
changing character of international investment and the
political economy of international trade and international
relations. I will argue, however, that this deployment of the
Market, and the accompanying reemergence of the Market
approach to development that occurred in the post-1980
period simply reenacts, at the global level, a Lochnerian
approach to market regulation that was shot down in the
United States in 1937.14
The aim is threefold. First, I aim to show that though
the "Market" does not have a definite meaning it is a useful
fiction that is used to manage various interventions and
policy and programmatic proposals. Conceptually, it has
become an important tool for International Financial
Institutions (IFIs) to use for expanding or constricting
policy outcomes as preferred. 15 In this mode, the deployment
12. I have borrowed this phrase from James Carrier. It refers to the period
that begun in the late 1970s with the victory of the Conservatives in Britain,
and ended in the early 1990s with the defeat of the Communists in Eastern
Europe. James G. Carrier, Introduction to MEANINGS OF THE MARKET: THE FREE
MARKET IN WESTERN CULTURE 1 (James G. Carrier ed., 1997).
13. For a brief but excellent description of these reforms, see Salacuse,
supra note 10, at 875.
14. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873,
874-75 (1987). Professor Sunstein explains that the principal criticism of
Lochner is not that the court engaged in illegitimate judicial activism in
substituting its wisdom for that of the legislature. Rather, the primary fault of
Lochner was that the court treated the market ordering under the extant rules
of common law as "natural" rather than as a legal construct. As such, the court
treated any governmental action departing from the common law baseline as
"unnatural" and therefore illegitimate.
15. For a description (and critique) of the role of International Financial
Institutions in determining economic policies of developing countries, see, for
example, SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER
IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (1996); Joel M. Ngugi, The World Bank and the
Ideology of Reform and Development in International Economic Development
2008]
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of the Market by IFIs can be analogized to how the lack of a
neat separation between public and private law creates a
dichotomy that is usefully and fruitfully exploited in
ideologically determining the propriety of legal intervention
in different areas of the law.16
Second, the Article aims to explain how the Market as
such a construct is deployed in Law and Development
discourse as a rhetorical device, metaphor, or strategy that
is used to institute or superintend the institution of a
Lochnerian approach to law and policy making. The concept
of the Market in Law and Development is used as a
strategy to "forget" the lessons of Lochner. The Article,
therefore, demonstrates how (and why) the framing of the
economic development discourse as a movement from
"Plan" to "Market"17 has had a powerful impact in shaping
and influencing available policy prescriptions, some of
which simply "naturalize" problematic and contested
aspects of reforms taking place in developing countries.
Third, I aim to reconfirm a truism about the workings
of the Market in the society that increasingly appears to be
clouded in the Law and Development discourses in the post-
1980 period. This truism is that the Market is about
regulation and political choices rather than about
deregulation and "innate" laws of economics.18 The Market
Discourse, 14 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 313 (2006).
16. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
17. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1996: FROM PLAN TO
MARKET (1996) [hereinafter WORLD BANK, FROM PLAN TO MARKET].
18. The idea that markets are primarily about competition and deregulation
is very strong in the literature. One could summarize the idea in the words of
Professor Paul Brietzke:
We can summarize the Chicago approach as a drawing of three
conclusions from three assumptions: If we assume almost everyone to
be economically rational, if almost all of their relations are like
exchanges in markets, and if markets almost never fail (are the most
nearly perfect social institutions), then (by definition) these rational
relations are efficient-involve the least waste of scarce resources. It
then follows that these efficient relations should be enforced as cheaply
as possible, under the common law, and then (by definition) statutory
and regulatory interventions in these efficient relations will be
inefficient and serve to reduce society's wealth. In other words, society
is so simple and monolithic that it can be coordinated by isolated and
fragmented contracts and markets, provided that the common law fully
and clearly specifies the parties' rights.
[Vol. 56
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is as much the product of state action and regulation as a
product of the interaction of rights such as property rights
or freedom of contract rights that some might be tempted to
regard as "natural" or pre-political. 19 The aim of Law and
Development, as a discipline, therefore, should be to
formulate ways in which the state can fruitfully regulate
the Market so as to enhance general social welfare, and to
make political choices that are also socially rational. Hence,
the Market is a product of not only individual choices and
actions devoid of state action but, the result of a dynamic
interaction of governmental choices with individual choices;
regulatory schemes interacting with deregulatory schemes;
politics interacting with economics; and so forth.
I. FROM PLAN TO MARKET AS A PARALLEL MOVEMENT FROM
STATUS TO CONTRACT
We wanted democracy, but we ended up with the bond market.2 0
Writing in 1861, Sir Henry Maine characterized the
ascent of Western civilization as a definitive shift from
status to contract:
The movement of the progressive societies has been uniform in one
respect. Through all its course it has been distinguished by the
gradual dissolution of family dependency and the growth of
individual obligation in its place .... [It is not] difficult to see
what is the tie between man and man which replaced by degrees
those forms of reciprocity in rights and duties which have their
origin in the family. It is contract .... [W]e may say that the
movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a
movement from Status to Contract.2 1
Paul H. Brietzke, New Wrinkles in Law ... and Economics, 32 VAL. U. L. REV.
105, 110 (1997). Professor Duncan Kennedy has also traced the intellectual
lineology of the intellectual tradition of "naturalizing" the "market" by classical
and neo-classical economists, and has refuted the idea that market outcomes
are "efficient" and "just." Instead, he argues, market outcomes are "decidedly
artificial and manipulable" and inherently inseparable from distributive
policies. Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the
Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 939, 959 (1985).
19. See Kennedy, supra note 18, at 939.
20. HANS-PETER MARTIN & HERALD SCHUMANN, THE GLOBAL TRAP:
GLOBALIZATION AND THE ASSAULT ON PROSPERITY AND DEMOCRACY 40 (Patrick
Camiller trans., 1997) (citing Polish graffiti).
21. SIR HENRY MAINE, ANCIENTLAW 99-100 (1977).
2008]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
Maine saw a clean break in the historical shift-one
that he considered most telling in the ascendancy of Western
civilization as compared to other cultures that continued to
organize their law in terms of status.22 Maine argued that
ancient law regarded the basic unit of society as the
collective, so much so that the individual was subsumed by
a series of status distinctions, each of which was transmitted
between generations. 23 He argued that the progression of
legal culture realized a shift from status as the basis of rights
to an individual capability to transmit property on a personal,
contractual basis.24 The clean, historical shift postulated by
Maine can be represented in tabular form as follows:
Status Contract
Collective, multilateral Bilateral negotiations
traditions and customs
Imposed norms Freedom of contract
Primacy of Primacy of individual
community/family
Social relations defined Social relations defined
through kinship networks through individual will
and ties
Mechanical solidarity: Organic solidarity: society




Collective property Private property
Family obligations Private autonomy
22. Maine found support in the work of Max Weber. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY
AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 671 (Guenther Roth &
Claus Wittich eds., 1978) (1956) ("[T]he farther we go back in legal history, the
less significant becomes contract as a device of economic acquisition in fields
other than the law of the family and inheritance."). However, deep into the
twentieth century this definitive characterization became less sure. See, e.g.,
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 1 (1974) ("Contract, like God, is
dead."); Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought, 30
HARv. L. REV. 201, 219 (1917) ("[T]he whole course of English and American law
today is belying it unless, indeed, we are progressing backward.").
23. MAINE, supra note 21, at 73-74.
24. Id. at 179.
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Maine's dichotomy, whether implicit or explicit, lasted
many years in legal thought ultimately shaping doctrines of
laissez faire and free markets and justified the rise of the
doctrine of untrammeled freedom of contract in the
nineteenth century. 25 However, it turned out to be a
misleading one: many aspects of the law, including the law
of contract, continued to organize legal rights and
entitlements according to status-like concepts as relational
contract theorists have demonstrated. 26 At the same time,
the perception that the pre-nineteenth century Western
world and the present Third World are governed by
collective, multilateral norms imposed on the members of
the society only rather than voluntary bilateral negotiations
that govern the twenty-first century Anglo-Saxon has been
25. In legal theory, the rise of contract reached its high point between the
mid- to late nineteenth century especially in the United States where the
Lochner-era court elevated liberty (constituting of freedom of contract and
private property) to constitutional status. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND
FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 405-19 (1979); Morton J. Horwitz, The
Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 917 (1974).
But for a trenchant critique of Horwitz's work, see A.W.B. Simpson, The
Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1979).
However, the Lochner-era was followed by a period of serious decline in the idea
of freedom of contract. First, Lochner and its progeny was overruled-beginning
with Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 510 (1934) ("But neither property rights
nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may
at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract."). By the mid-1960s, Kahn-Freund remarked that a reversion of the
movement described by Maine was taking place: the new movement was from
contract to status. 0. Kahn-Freund, A Note on Status and Contract in British
Labour Law, 30 MOD. L. REV. 635 (1967).
26. See, e.g., IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO
MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract:
What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WiS. L. REV. 483; Ian R. Macneil, The
Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974). Many recent works on
the Market model also challenge the notion that market actors are autonomous
individuals dealing with each other contractually at arm's length. These
research projects demonstrate that firms and individuals often use ties other
than impersonal contractual relationships in transacting (i.e., kinship ties to
recruit in the fishing industry in New England). See, e.g., Peter B. Doeringer et
al., Capitalism and Kinship: Do Institutions Matter in the Labor Market?, 40
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 48 (1986). Mutually understood criteria of fairness is
used in transactions for many firms in the United States, Marc Granovetter,
Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J.
SOC. 481 (1985), and Japan, Ronald Dore, Goodwill and the Spirit of Market
Capitalism, 34 BRIT. J. SOC. 459 (1983).
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challenged as inaccurate. 27 However, the construction of
this historical break-and the misleading dichotomy it
created-generated a powerful explanatory, analytical,
rhetorical, and justificatory tool for various political and
legal projects from the mid-nineteenth century to the
present.
Legal scholars, economists, political economists, and
development technocrats have similarly characterized a
shift that occurred in the last two decades in the
development discourse and model of development as a
definitive shift from Plan to Market. 28 They perceive a clean
break from "plan"-the pre-1980 development model with
its emphasis on four basic elements: public ordering and
state planning of the economy and society, reliance on state
enterprises as economic actors, restriction and regulation of
private enterprise, and limitation and control of the
27. See, e.g., SALLY FALK MOORE, LAW AS PROCESS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL
APPROACH 54-81 (1978). Moore pointed to the "semi-autonomous social field" as
a site in which rulemaking and rule-enforcement occur, often independent of
official laws and legal institutions, yet subject at times to their control. The
"semi-autonomous social field" existed in eighteenth century Britain,
nineteenth and twentieth century United States, as well as across the Third
World then and now. Sylvia Kang'ara has developed this critique to make some
generalizations about particular conceptions of property that are deemed to be
"African" and therefore associated with "status" and those that are deemed to
be "Western" and therefore associated with "contract." She identifies six
characteristics often attributed to African conception of property: it is governed
by custom, norms, negotiations, spiritism, traditions, and communalism. On the
other hand, "Western" conception of property is governed by the opposite of each
of these "African" attributes: it is governed by contract, law, adjudication,
commodity, modernity, and individualism. Maine would easily have associated
the first list with "status" relationships and extol the second as unshackled from
the vise of status to contract. Sylvia Kang'ara, Is There an African Conception
of Property? (2002) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard Law School) (on
file with author).
28. Initially, the phrase "From Plan to Market" was supplied by the World
Bank. WORLD BANK, FROM PLAN TO MARKET, supra note 17. This is a phrase that
has subsequently gained currency to explain the development policies in vogue
in the post-1980 period. The periodization of when this shift actually started
differs with each writer with many identifying the fall of communism in 1989 as
the defining moment. However, in this study, I take the year 1980 as the
moment that the shift occurred. This is because, in the development discourse,
the shift predated the fall of communism. It was triggered by the right-ward
move in politics in the United States and Britain and the pressures this put on
multilateral donors to developing countries, and the debt-crisis that started in
earnest in 1981.
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country's economic relations with the outside world.29 This
has given way to the "market"-the post-1980 consensus on
economic development with an emphasis on the opposite
attributes of those associated with the earlier era: reliance
on private ordering and markets, privatization, deregulation,
and opening of economies. 30 In short, the "developmental
state" of the pre-1980 era has given way to the "market-
friendly minimalist state" in the post-1980 period. As the
World Bank observed:
It is a hard fact of transition that the features of a market
economy that many of these countries need most are the very ones
that will take the longest to build . . . . [M]oving from plan to
market requires a new way of thinking about the entire legal
system.
3 1
The image and role of the law in development in each of
the two eras is similarly contrasted. Of the first era, it is
said that:
First, [this model], with its emphasis on state planning, public
ordering, and heavy regulation, relied heavily on public law to
achieve its objectives and accorded private law only a limited role
in the development process. More fundamentally, it led governments
to see law's basic purpose as bringing about desired social and
economic change, rather than merely setting down the rules
within which persons and organizations would conduct their
economic and social activities in accordance with their individual
interests. Implicitly or explicitly, governments and scholars
seemed to believe that law was a tool for social engineering;
therefore they embarked on programs of legal reform whose goal
was to abolish certain social and economic practices and institute
new ones in their place.
32
The image of the law in the post-1980 market model is
described differently-as a move from "public ordering to
private ordering of economic activity. Organizations and
individuals have gained increased legal freedom to arrange
transactions through contract. Conversely, the form and
substance of economic transactions are less and less
29. Salacuse, supra note 10, at 877.
30. See id. at 882-86.
31. WORLD BANK, FROM PLAN TO MARKET, supra note 17, at 97.
32. Salacuse, supra note 10, at 880.
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mandated by governmental regulations and directives." 33
As Julio Faundez writes:
In a market-friendly state, law is not an all purpose tool at the
service of an interventionist state .... Instead, law, [sic] provides
rules to facilitate market transactions mainly by defining property
rights, guaranteeing the enforcement of contracts and maintaining
law and order. Law is no longer a protagonist of social and
economic change. Its role, though indispensable, is largely
passive.
34
The prevailing understanding in development discourse
at present, therefore, is that there is a "consensus" about
the market model. 35 This consensus is often constructed by
way of contrasting the two models--one, a pre-1980 model,
with an obvious emphasis on public law and the state as the
engine of economic policies, the other, a post-1980 model,
placing its emphasis on private law and the market as the
engine of economic policies. It is also often expressed in
terms of the role of the government in economic functioning.
In this conception, the shift is conceived as a reduction of
the economic role of the government-with the government
relinquishing these roles to the private markets. In short,
the pre-1980 development era is characterized and
remembered with its association with the "state." The post-
1980 era, on the other hand, is described in terms of its
association with the "market. '36 This postulated shift from
Plan to Market can be represented as follows:
33. Id. at 887.
34. Julio Faundez, Legal Technical Assistance, in GOOD GOVERNMENT AND
LAw: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1, 13 (Julio
Faundez ed., 1997).
35. This consensus is now widely known as the "Washington Consensus."
John Williamson originally coined the phrase. John Williamson, What
Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: How
MUCH HAS HAPPENED 5 (John Williamson ed., 1990).
36. See generally WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1991: THE
CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT (1991) [hereinafter WORLD BANK, THE CHALLENGE
OF DEVELOPMENT].
[Vol. 56
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Plan Market
Public ordering using public Private ordering using private
laws laws
State enterprises Privatization and private
enterprises
Economic regulation Deregulation
Managed trade Free trade
Command economy Price economy
Role of law's role: Role of law: passive; neutral
distributive; social rules of the game
engineering
Collective property Private property
Government intervention Laissez faire
State planning and design Markets and anti-design
State as engine of economic Markets as engine of economic
policies policies
From a cursory glance of these two tabular
representations, it seems fairly obvious that today's
dichotomization between "Plan" and "Market" closely
parallels Maine's dichotomization between "status" and
"contract." Maine's dichotomization, notwithstanding its
veracity or falsity, became an important tool that was used
to justify, specific legal, social, and political projects in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries' Western
world.3 7 Maine's dichotomization was a construction of
37. Many reforms in modern law were justified as the progressive movement
from status to contract. Some of these reforms could be thought of as politically
progressive-for example, the prohibition of slavery and other race-based legal
classifications. Some of these reforms could be thought of as politically
conservative-for example, the rise of laissez faire economics which led,
ultimately, to Lochnerism. As Roscoe Pound wrote, Lochnerism was ultimately
a result not of economic bias but a blinding belief in the progressive narrative of
status to contract. Pound wrote:
This opposition [social legislation such as minimum wage laws] was not
due to class bias or economic associations or social relations of the
judges nor to sinister influences brought to bear upon them, as was
assumed so freely in the American presidential campaign of 1912,
when such decisions were in issue. The judges were imbued with a
genuine faith in the tenets of the historical school, especially the
political interpretation and the doctrine of progress from status to
contract. Hence it seemed to them that the constitutional requirement
of due process of law was violated by legislative attempts to restore
status and restrict the contractual powers of free men by enacting that
men of full age and sound mind in particular callings should not be
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ideal-type representations of the two periods he was
studying--one constructed by generalization, intensification,
homogenization, and dramatization of specific aspects of the
two periods. However, its explanatory power lay, not in its
veracity or falsity, but by the fact that at the point of
application and deployment for legal or political projects,
the ideal type representations were used as though they are
in fact, the reality.38 In the same way the dichotomization
between "Plan" and "Market" becomes an important
analytical tool that generates a discourse that comprehends,
justifies and legitimizes specific legal, social and political
projects in development. Again, the telling aspect is not so
much the veracity or falsity of the dichotomization, but the
way its construction unleashes a series of further
theoretical maneuvers that serve as justification or
legitimization of specific political, legal, or social projects.
Hence, in this Article, I reject as too crude and
simplistic the two models that are often offered to
understand and explain the shift in development discourse
and the larger process of integration of economies and
models of social order worldwide that accompanies it. This
larger process is called "globalization."39 These two models
are as follows.
One model would understand the shift as a logical
response to the radial diffusion of institutions produced by
able to make agreements which other men might make freely.
ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 62-63 (1923).
38. As Jerome Frank wrote, some legal fictions are useful but legal myths
are never useful because they maintain a false perception of the law among
laymen and professionals alike. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 40-
41 (1930).
39. Although with legal consequences, and although law facilitates it,
globalization is not primarily a legal concept. Its definition is hotly contested
across and within disciplines. Many sociologists would define globalization as
"the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in
such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles
away and vice versa." ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 64
(1990). Many economists and political scientists would agree with Joseph
Stiglitz's definition of globalization as an integration of, and thus a cost savings
in, transport and communications, and marked reductions in artificial barriers
to the transnational movement of goods and services, capital, technology,
various forms of knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 21 (2002). Increasingly, this process is




interactions between social actors in an increasingly
stateless world. 40 These institutions are legitimated in
rationalistic and universalistic terms and are globalized
through instrumental culture. Typifying this approach,
sociologist Martin Albrow writes that there is "no axial
principle underlying global institutions."41 Rather, there is
a pluralism reflecting "no theory of the greater good, simply
the historic accumulation and interplay of national
experiences and expertise coming to terms with each
other."
42
The second approach understands the shift and the
larger "globalization" project linked to it as a translation of
material interests by powerful sectors at the global stage to
strengthen their hand in international relations for
material gains in terms of power or wealth. 43 Typifying this
approach, Caroline Thomas writes that:
Globalization . . .refers broadly to the process whereby power is
located in global social formations and expressed through global
networks rather than through territorially-based states ....
Transnational capitalist institutions are speeding up and
deepening the realignment of social and class relations within
what is already a single world-system. They are setting the global
economic, social and political agenda.
44
Both these approaches would understand the shift in
development discourse in the 1980s solely in teleological or
instrumental fashion. In other words, employed by
development scholars, these two approaches would seek to
explain the shift in development discourse in the 1980s in
40. This is the most common explanation for "globalization" in sociology and
international relations. See, e.g., CONSTRUCTING WORLD CULTURE (John Boli &
George M. Thomas eds., 1999); GEORGE M. THOMAS, JOHN W. MEYER, FRANCISCO
0. RAMIREZ & JOHN BOLI, INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE: CONSTITUTING STATE,
SOCIETY, AND THE INDIVIDUAL (1987); John W. Meyer et al., World Society and
the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. Soc. 144 (1997).
41. MARTIN ALBROW, THE GLOBAL AGE 125 (1996).
42. Id.
43. Most critics of globalization and most Third World scholars would fall
into this category. See, e.g., WALDEN BELLO, THE DARK VICTORY (1994); SUSAN
GEORGE & FABRIZIO SABELI, FAITH AND CREDIT: THE WORLD BANK'S SECULAR
EMPIRE (1994); Caroline Thomas, Globalization and the South, in
GLOBALIZATION AND THE SOUTH 1 (Caroline Thomas & Peter Wilkin eds., 1997).
44. Thomas, supra note 43, at 6.
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terms of globalized instrumental models: one in terms of its
diffusion, the other in terms of an instrumental imposition.
In both approaches, "globalization," as an explanation of the
shift, involves a universalistic logic that subsumes hitherto
culturally distinctive societies within the one emerging
global order thereby corroding the preexisting cultural,
political, social, and even legal logic of these societies and
replacing it with its own.
In the remainder of this Article, however, I seek to
understand the shift in a different way. Rather than take
the shift for granted, and then search for its causes, I begin
by problematizing the shift itself. By questioning how the
shift is constructed, characterized, and ultimately deployed,
it becomes possible to change the focus from the fact of the
shift itself, to the mechanisms for its production, construction,
and deployment. By focusing on the mechanisms that
produce, enable, characterize, construct, constrain, and
deploy the shift, I put my sight on how the discourse
generates the vocabulary, politics, and available policy tools
whose interaction with each other reinforce (and are
reinforced by), enable (and are enabled by), and constrain
(and are constrained by) the discourse itself. This complex
interaction ultimately produces the discourse that drives
the process of development.
II. THE MEANING AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE MARKET IN
DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE
Consider the following definition of the market by
James Carrier: "The [M]arket is not what people do and
think, and how they interact when they buy and sell, give
and take. Instead, it is a conception people have about an
idealized form of buying and selling."45
This conception of the Market is remarkable because it
reminds us at once that though the Market is merely idealized,
it is ordinarily used--or more accurately, invoked-implicitly
and explicitly in academic argumentation in debating the
wisdom of policy prescriptions and in supporting particular
interventions and programmatic proposals as the reason or
argument for establishing a given sort of "buying or
45. James G. Carrier, Preface to MEANINGS OF THE MARKET: THE FREE
MARKET IN WESTERN CULTURE, supra note 12, at vii, vii.
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selling."46 As I will show shortly, this element of the market
demonstrates how this conception of the Market can
comprehend particular dualisms and how it has shaped
particular debates about economic development, the role of
government in economic development, and international
relations generally.
What this definition flags from the outset is the fact
that the Market is not a clear conceptual or analytical
concept that rigorously, logically, or definitionally determines
the relations between economic actors. It should be fairly
obvious that this conception of the "Market" is not the
"Market Model" that is studied in academic economics. 4
7
Indeed, for reasons discussed in this Article, to concentrate
on the academic model of the Market would be to miss the
forest for the trees. This is because, often, the Market
Model and the conception of the Market that is
operationalized in the politics of reform and development is
an idealized one that is different from what economists and
politicians work with. While the Market Model intersects
with this "real life" notion of the Market at many points,
what is more significant in the context of reform and
international development is not what real economists do or
believe. Rather, what is more significant is the
representation of the idealized Market in the development
discourse. It is this representation that is deployed in
support or opposition to particular interventions or policies.
In this mode, the Market, rather than being a clear
analytical concept, is a way of thinking about the relations
between the economic actors that are constantly changing
and being redefined. As such, though the Market is
presented as a technocratic and predictable tool, it functions
more as a political rhetoric that justifies and legitimates a
particular economic system. Thus, it oscillates between a
definition as an analytical tool that prescribes a desired
society and a definition as a legitimating tool that merely
justifies a particular instantiation of economic relations in a
particular society.
In this way, the functioning of the Market in economic
and legal analysis is more like the public/private distinction





example, shown that the public/private dichotomy, though
pervasive in labor relations, lacks conceptual clarity.
Rather, the dichotomy provides "a series of ways of thinking
about public and private that are constantly undergoing
revision, reformulation, and refinement . . . . The
public/private distinction poses as an analytical tool ... but
it functions more as a form of political rhetoric used to
justify particular results." 45
This analogue is particularly fitting. Karl Klare argues
that the public/private distinction creates and shapes the
terrain over which labor disputes are fought.49 The dichotomy
helps limit the powers of some, while simultaneously
expanding those of others,50 as does the market function in
the reform and development discourse. It creates and
shapes the terrain and repertoire of reform. Its lack of
precise analytical content makes it a powerful political
rhetoric for justifying particular results.
The end results entail changing economic and social
positions of some people-at once positively and negatively.
They also entail widely varying economic and political
interventions at different times. However, since the Market
provides ways of thinking and the vocabulary for thinking
about the different issues, it glosses over the apparent
political choices that are and must be made. Hence, the
terrain constituted by the dualistic nature of the Market
concept has the ability to mediate its own conceptual
incoherence yet make prescriptions and draw policy
implications of a concrete kind even whilst remaining at a
very general level of analysis. 51
The upshot of this is three-fold. First, as Robert Hale
long ago wrote, the state is unavoidably constitutive of the
economy.52 Second, the Market as a category justifies and
48. Karl E. Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 1358, 1361 (1982).
49. Id.
50. See id. at 1362, 1394.
51. Christopher Colclough, Structuralism Versus Neo-Liberalism: An
Introduction, in STATES OR MARKETS?: NEO-LIBERALISM AND THE DEVELOPMENT
POLICY DEBATE 1, 17 (Christopher Colclough & James Manor eds., 1990).
52. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943) (arguing that government and law play a more
significant role in a market economy than neo-classical economists let on);
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legitimates a wide array of policy prescriptions and
interventions. Again, this is simply a restatement of the
insight first made by Robert Hale that the institutions that
underpin the Market are heterogeneous in nature. 53 These
interventions are, at times, at odds with each other.
However, the construction of the Market comprehends them
all to produce profoundly stable, albeit incoherent, melange
of policy preferences. Third, the application of "market
reforms" is not an inherently progressive or conservative
move politically. It may be one or the other at different
times. In technocratic terms, it does not necessarily lead to
more or less state intervention in economic functioning. It
may do either thing at different times.
54
The principal point to make here, therefore, is that the
creation of a "market society" through appeals to the state
to cede more economic function to the private economic
actors may lead to more or less state intervention in
economic functioning.55 Therefore, it begs the question to
justify particular reforms merely on grounds that they are
"Market-oriented" hence more efficient. The perception of
whether the process of constituting, shaping and creating
the private actors and the terrain in which they will operate
is state intervention or market reform; right wing project or
left wing project, efficient distribution or inefficient
redistribution is not determined by the analytical ability of
Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State,
38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923) (arguing that even in a laissez-faire system, the
government and laws inevitably restrict individual choices, and that laws are,
by definition, coercive); Robert L. Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of
"Political" and "Economic" Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 149 (1935) (arguing
that the political power of the state is qualitatively no different than the kind of
power that some private individuals can exercise against other private
individuals).
53. See supra note 52.
54. Again, I follow in the footsteps of Robert Hale who demonstrated that
while coercion originates from both private and public action, it should be
judged not by its source, but by its consequences. See, e.g., BARBARA H. FRIED,
THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW
AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 18 (1998). See generally Warren J. Samuels, The
Economy as a System of Power and its Legal Bases: The Legal Economics of
Robert Lee Hale, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 261 (1973).
55. Market-oriented legal reforms in developing countries are justified in
terms of reducing the role of the state in economic functioning. See infra Part
IV.
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the "market" to render such judgment. 56 Rather, it is
determined by the political rhetoric that bears the
particular action being described or justified. In order to
demonstrate this aspect and construction of the market, I
will trace below, two dualist ways in which the concept has
been used in the discourse.
First, I will show how the concept of the market in the
antecedents of international development discourse was
constructed as the opposite of communism. 57 In this mode,
various state interventions were permitted whilst still
viewing the operating paradigm as "Market-oriented" as
opposed to "central planning" that was associated with
communism. 58
Second, I will demonstrate how since the mid-1980s the
meaning of the market has shifted remarkably in the
development discourse. In this period, the market has
increasingly been defined as the opposite of the state. 59 In
the first mode, a particular brand of the state, preferred for
its "non-communist" tendencies, is seen as a necessary
corollary to the market and is given a prominent role in the
discourse in shaping economic goals and development. In
this first mode, therefore, this brand of the state is a "good
thing"-a collective good to be nurtured and encouraged. In
the second mode, the state is a necessary evil-an intrusive
predator to be minimized and kept away from the Market
and the economic functioning of the society. Both modes of
understanding the Market define it in polar opposition to
something else: first to "communism" and central-planning
and then to the government. As is perhaps obvious to many,
both modes of dichotomies between the Market and the
state reveal contradictions. The strength of the dualism is
that the dichotomization still acts as the idealized starting
point in tailoring, and therefore constraining and limiting,
the set of policy instruments that are available.
56. As Robert Hale argued, coercion should be judged by its target not
source. See FRIED, supra note 54, at 18.
57. See infra Part III.
58. See infra Part III.
59. See Infra Part IV.
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III. THE STATE AND THE MARKET IN DEVELOPMENT
DISCOURSE BETWEEN 1950 AND 1980
On January 20, 1949, Harry Truman was inaugurated
the thirty-third President of the United States. He titled his
inaugural speech, "The Faith of the American People."60 In
it, he outlined the Truman doctrine of democratic fair-
dealing.61 The fourth principle of the Truman doctrine is
now considered the origin of the development movement in
international relations and international economic law.
62
He said:
[W]e must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits
of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.
More than half the people of the world are living in conditions
approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of
disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their
poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more
prosperous areas.
6 3
President Truman then went on to outline his vision for
helping these underdeveloped areas:
For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge-
and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people.
... The material resources which we can afford to use for the
assistance of other peoples are limited. But our imponderable
resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and
inexhaustible.
I believe we should make available to peace-loving peoples of the
benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them
realize their aspirations for a better life. And, in cooperation with
other nations, we should foster capital investment in areas
needing development.
This should be a cooperative enterprise in which all nations
work together through the United Nations and its specialized
60. HARRY TRUMAN, The Faith of the American People, in HARRY TRUMAN, A
NEW ERA IN WORLD AFFAIRS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS OF PRESIDENT
TRUMAN 1, 6 (1949).
61. Id. at 8.
62. See ARTURO ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND
UNMAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD 1 (Sherry B. Ortner et al. eds., 1996).
63. TRUMAN, supra note 60, at 6.
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agencies wherever possible.
64
But, the new proposals for spurring economic
development in the Third World that President Truman
had in mind were different from "old imperialism" that was
devised and controlled to benefit areas other than those in
which they were established:
The old imperialism-exploitation for foreign profit-has no
place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of development
based on the concepts of democratic fair-dealing.
[Since a]ll countries . . . will greatly benefit from a constructive
program for the better use of the world's human and natural
resources.
65
In enunciating this vision President Truman saw as an"occasion to proclaim to the world the essential principles of
the faith by which [the United States] live[s], and to declare
[the United States] aims to all peoples."66 President
Truman clearly saw it as a product of liberal democracy as
opposed to communism. Declaring communism a "false
philosophy," he proceeded to declare that communism
actually inhibits the constructive program to realize
economic development and the material well-being of
human beings worldwide. 67
This speech on the vision of development is important
for the reason that it set out the provinces of the
"constructive program" that became the development
endeavor.68 Two important axes are particularly germane.
First, what was to be shared with the underdeveloped areas
was not "material resources," but the "imponderable
resources in technical knowledge." 69 Second, the preferred
form of political governance was liberal democracy, and not
communism; and the channel of development would be the
market.70 Both of these axes proved to be the most
64. Id. at 6-7.
65. Id. at 8.
66. Id. at 2.
67. Id. at 3.
68. See ESCOBAR, supra note 62, at 3.
69. TRUMAN, supra note 60, at 6-7.
70. Id. at 7.
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important markers of the development discourse in the pre-
1980 period.
This way of thinking-economic development as the
opposite of communism, and the market system as the
opposite of central planning-created the first dualism that
pervades the development discourse. This is the
construction of the market by using the binary opposites of"rational" and "irrational. 71 The first step in this process is
to construct the ideal market. By "equat[ing] technical
efficiency with value-loaded optimality, declaring that the
best market is the ideal of 'perfect competition' functioning
invisibly without government intervention and [with]
perfect competition," the mainstream theory proceeded to
formulate policies "as if such ideal markets existed or could
possibly exist."72 At the same time, these assumptions
which make up this idealized version of the Market are
seen through the rational-irrational axis. The Market is
constructed upon axioms of individualism and utility
maximization that are projected as rational. 73 At the same
time, other modes of human behavior-for example, those
derived from sharing and cooperation-are deemed
irrational. 74 For example, mainstream theorists share a
71. See OZAY MEHMET, WESTERNIZING THE THIRD WORLD: THE EUROCENTRICITY
OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THEORIES 5 (1995).
72. Id. at 5.
73. The standard 'Market hypothesis" is that all human beings are rational,
and act on the basis of a stable set of preferences to maximize their utility. See
GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976). To
this extent, law and economics theorists argue that the proper role of law and
legal institutions is to determine which legal regimes would have the effect of
ensuring the goal of utility maximization is met. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL
POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 9-10 (2d ed. 1989);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-4 (5th ed. 1998). This vision
of the individual and the workings of the Market has been criticized by, among
others, scholars writing in the tradition of Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics as well as Institutional Economists who challenge, and argue for the
relaxation of, the three key assumptions of the economic approach: rationality,
utility maximization, and stable preferences. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS 13, 14-15 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (explaining the notion of
bounded rationality as a key constraint on the microeconomic assumptions of
law and economics).
74. This form of dualism parallels the deep-rooted Western intellectual
tradition of differentiating the "Other." It has its roots in ancient Greek dualism
of the cosmos that differentiates rational-irrational along the same axis as
citizen-barbarian. This mindset was functional in the colonial project. See, e.g.,
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strong presumption that "imperfect" markets such as
monopolies and cartels, can be reformed and ultimately
converted into ideal perfect competition in the undefined
long-run.7 5
The Market concept as used in economic development
discourse, however, is dualist in yet another sense. It is
both a method of analysis and a formula for prescribing
concrete policy positions at the same time, as opposed to
being one or the other. The Market is not just an analytical
mode that is used to evaluate economies and their systems
of allocating resources vis-a-vis growth rates, productive
capacities, redistributive goals, and so forth. Nor is the
Market just used to prescribe a set of policy interventions
that must be implemented. It is, and it serves, both
functions. I return to this characteristic of the Market and
its implications for policy intervention below.
Applying the idealized rationalist Market solution to the
design of economic policy to promote economic development
involved overlooking an inherent contradiction-between
this mainstream Market theory and the state intervention
that was promoted in the first quarter of the post-war
period.76 The construction of the Market as the polar
opposite of communism was important in glossing over this
Anthony Anghie, Fransisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International
Law, 5 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 321 (1996). Anghie illustrates how constructing the
Indians as the "other" rationalized Spanish conquest to international law's
different treatment of the Indians. Similarly, Anghie argues that the goal of
"universalizing" international law, itself principally a consequence of the
imperial expansion that took place in the nineteenth century, was achieved
through the granting or withholding "sovereignty" to the non-European states.
This way, the universalization of international law becomes the extension and
universalization of the European experience. This, in turn, is achieved by
"transmuting [the European experience] into the major theoretical problem of
the discipline, [and] has the effect of suppressing and subordinating other
histories of international law and the people to whom it has applied." Anthony
Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-
Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 7 (1999).
75. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21
STAN. L. REV. 548-49 (1969) (arguing that even in the case of natural
monopolies, it is more efficient to let the market determine prices and conduct
of the supplier rather than government regulation).
76. Between 1945 and 1980, the development theory promoted a view of the
'Market" that admitted that there was pervasive market failure, at least in the
Third World, and hence intrusive state regulation was needed for markets to




contradiction. It also glossed over another aspect of the
market. It is that the market is a byproduct of legal rules
and property rights that are sponsored and supported by
the state. 77 As I will explain below, this second tension
within the Market concept became a big theoretical gap to
be filled and explained in the "long decade" of the 1980s
when the second wave of "Market-oriented" reforms hit the
development discourse. 78 However, it did not pose a big
problem in this first phase of 'Market-oriented" reforms (in
the 1950s and 1960s) as applied to the developing world.
The reason for this is that, as already mentioned, the state
in the developing world had already been acknowledged in
the literature as a major factor in development. 79 This was
due to the polar definition of the "market way" as the
opposite of communism.80 It was taken for granted that a
government that facilitated development policies and
embraced liberal political institutions and norms as
"universal reference" was "Market-oriented.'
As a result, in the first quarter of the international
development history, economic development was based on
idealized and stylized characteristics of a "typical under-
77. As Professor Warren Samuels argues:
[Tihe perceived spheres of polity and economy, of law and market, are
not self-subsistent, and ... it is helpful to understand what transpires
by identifying the existence of a legal-economic nexus in which both
seemingly distinct spheres commonly originate . . . . [T]he legal-
economic nexus-the sphere of what is really going on at the deepest
level of social existence-is the level at which both polity and economy
are continuously and simultaneously (re)formed in a manner that
negates any conception of their independent self-subsistence. Although
not denying the possibility, if not the good sense, of contemplating the
legal-economic nexus only as an alternative mode of discourse or
analysis, the argument affirms both the actual existence of the legal-
economic nexus and the paramount importance of understanding it
relative to analyses that postulate separate, self-subsistent, political
and economic spheres.
Warren J. Samuels, The Legal-Economic Nexus, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1556,
1557-58 (1989).
78. See infra notes 91-111 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
81. See Frangois Bourricaud, Modernity, 'Universal Reference' and the




developed country. '8 2 The task of mapping out the
development agenda was explicitly seen as one of choosing
policy instruments for causing specific directed changes in
the economy.8 3 The intervention by the state was not only
seen as legitimate, it was seen as necessary. A large part of
this thinking can be attributed to two factors. First, as I
have already pointed out, once a state embraced the
"development agenda," it was deemed to be a "market
society." This was, again, because the market was defined
to exclude the "false philosophy" of communism.
8 4
Second, a large part of the widespread acceptance of the
fundamental role of the state in directing development in
developing countries was based on the implicit assumption
that the states in the developing countries had to overcome
the fundamental obstacle of transforming their polities
from pre-modern traditional societies to modernity.8 5 The
reasoning was that the market can only work where the
actors are "rational" since the Market model is based on the
utility maximizing behavior of a rational actor.8 6 Yet, a
powerful and popular literature in the political science and
anthropology discourses suggested that most of the rural
denizens of the developing countries (constituting more
than eighty percent of the populations there), were not
"rational."87 The dominant paradigm in these discourses is
represented by the following quote from Daniel Lerner's
book, considered in many respects a classic:
A mobile society has to encourage rationality, for the calculus of
choice shapes individual behavior and conditions its rewards.
People come to see the social future as manipulable rather than
ordained and their personal prospects in terms of achievement
rather than heritage. Rationality is purposive: ways of thinking
and acting are instruments of intention (not articles of faith); men
82. See ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, THE STRATEGY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 3
(1958).
83. See, e.g., Wilfred Malenbaum, Transforming Traditional Agriculture, in
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1965, at 22, 22-24 (Stefan H. Robock & Leo M.
Solomon eds., 1966).
84. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
85. See MEHMET, supra note 71, at 56.
86. Id. at 5.
87. DANIEL LERNER, THE PASSING OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETY: MODERNIZING THE
MIDDLE EAST 48-50 (1958).
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succeed or fail by the test of what they accomplish (not what they
worship). So whereas traditional man tended to reject innovation
by saying '[i]t has never been thus,' the contemporary Westerner is
more likely to ask "Does it work?" and try the new way without
further ado.
[Such Westerners] have a high empathic capacity [which is] the
predominant personal style only in modern society, which is
distinctively industrial, urban, literate and participant.
Traditional society is nonparticipant-it deploys people by kinship
into communities isolated from each other and from a center;
without an urban-rural division of labor, it develops few needs
requiring economic interdependence; lacking the bonds of
interdependence, people's horizons are limited by locale and their
decisions involve only other known people in known situations.
Hence, there is no need for a transpersonal common doctrine
formulated in terms of shared secondary symbols-a national
'ideology' which enables persons unknown to each other to engage
in political controversy or achieve 'consensus' by comparing their
opinions.
8 8
The dominant approaches to pre-capitalist (agrarian)
societies, therefore, posited that these societies existed in a
world of subsistence production in which there are no
markets, no buying, and no trading.8 9 Orthodox economists
accepted that it was necessary for the state to take the lead
88. Id.
89. Robert Bates, Some Conventional Orthodoxies in the Study of Agrarian
Change 19 (Div. of the Humanities and Soc. Scis., Cal. Inst. of Tech., Working
Paper No. 458, 1982). According to Bates, actually, there are two dominant
orthodoxies. Id. The "natural economy" model of "primitive societies" finds its
eloquent explanation in the works of MAINE, supra note 21; TRIBAL AND PEASANT
ECONOMIES (George Dalton ed., 1967); KARL MARX, Pre-Capitalist Economic
Formations, in KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, PRE-CAPITALIST SOCIO-
ECONOMIC FORMATIONS 84, 97-98 (1979). The "peasant economy" model, on the
other hand has its most influential support in the works of PEASANTS AND
PEASANT SOCIETY (Teodor Shanin ed., 1971); A. V. CHAYANOV, THE THEORY OF
PEASANT ECONOMY (Daniel Thorner et al. eds., 1966). As Bates points out, both
models have as their starting points historical conditions that have rarely
existed. Bates, supra, at 19. The first model posits that the "primitive society"
produces not for exchange but for use. Id. at 4. "[A]s a consequence[,] 'market
exchanges are usually peripheral' . . . [and] labor and land do not enter the
market." Id. The second model posits that most societies in developing countries
represent peasant societies. In these societies labor is not separated from the
means of production. Nonetheless, such societies are more "advanced" from
those represented in the first model. Id. at 13. The societies here "reside within
state systems and within economies which contain cities, industry and
manufacturing." Id.
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role in unleashing the exogenous shock that would
transform these pre-capitalist societies into market societies.
In this regard, Gerald Meier and R. E. Baldwin wrote:
The psychological and sociological requirements for development
are as important as the economic requirement. They deserve full
consideration in their own right . . . . It is obvious that some
institutional changes which are not merely economic must
accompany successful development efforts. Economic development
of sufficient rapidity has not taken place within the present
cultural framework. New wants, new motivations, new ways of
production, new institutions need to be created if national income
is to rise more rapidly. Where there are religious obstacles to
modern economic progress, the religion may have to be taken less
seriously or its character altered. Fundamentally the backward
peoples must recognize that men can master nature; they must be
motivated towards economic achievement; they must acquire the
means of accomplishing these objectives; and these objectives must
become part of the society's value structure.
90
Therefore, development technocrats of this era accepted
the state as the primary agency for the expansion of the
market.91 As juxtaposed against the dominant Market
paradigm, state-led capitalism in the developing world
could be justified in one of two ways. First, it could be
justified as a means of administering the exogenous shock
to facilitate the transformation of the peasants into rational
actors within the capitalist system. 92 This was because "the
90. GERALD M. MEIER & ROBERT E. BALDWIN, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
THEORY, HISTORY, POLICY 355-57 (1957).
91. See, e.g., Henry C. Wallich, Some Notes Towards a Theory of Derived
Development, in THE ECONOMICS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT 189, 200-02 (A. N.
Agarwala & S. P. Singh eds., 1963). Wallich writes: "In the less developed
countries, where private enterprise is weak, development is not likely to go
forward rapidly if the government.., remains passive [as in the Schumpeterian
theory]. Thus, derived development calls for some measure of government
intervention." Id. at 201.
92. See, e.g., BENJAMIN HIGGINS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: PRINCIPLES,
PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 312 (1959). Higgins writes:
Hagen himself refers to one dramatic case of rapid cultural change-
the revolutionary development of Manus society as a consequence of
occupation of the island by American troops during World War II. This
experience suggests that an almost complete transformation of a
society can take place within a few years if the external 'shock' to the
society is powerful enough.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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existence of a pre-capitalist agrarian society [was]
characterized by a preference for subsistence which . . .
frustrated the growth of [the capitalist system]," and the
Market. 93 Goran Hyden, epitomizing this school of thought
wrote that:
The argument is... that.., where the peasant mode is very much
alive, there is an economy other than the market economy.
Moreover, this economy of affection is being maintained and
defended against the intrusions of the market economy.
So common is this situation ... that it is not an exaggeration to
claim that the principal structural constraint to development are
the barriers raised . . .by the peasant mode of production ....
[Policy makers must] get the peasant [to be] involved in the cash
nexus .... [T]here is no other way available but to raise peasant
productivity and make him produce more than for his own
domestic needs.
94
The argument made was that in order for the peasants
to play a meaningful role in capitalist development, two
things were necessary. First, it was imperative that the
peasants were forced to generate sufficient surplus for
development purposes. This meant that the peasants had to
produce more than they required for subsistence. 95 Second,
it was imperative to drive the development policy such that
there was a mechanism for appropriating the surplus
generated by the peasant and transferring it into other
areas of the economy such as industrialization or
technology development. 96 Wilfred Malenbaum stated this
position in 1965 in the following words:
First the task of transforming the traditional sector is the key task
of overall development in today's poor countries. Without this
transformation, self-sustaining growth will not be achieved.
Second, the task is primarily one of overcoming non-economic
deterrents to change.
In traditional sectors, the social, institutional, and
motivational milieu prevents optimum resource use. Only with
93. Bates, supra note 89, at 48.
94. GoRAN HYDEN, BEYOND UJAMAA IN TANzANIA: UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND
AN UNCAPTURED PEASANTRY 19, 31 (1980).
95. Id. at 31.
96. Id.
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programs which reach for change in these non-economic deterrents
can there be economic adjustments toward . . large-scale
programs of education and training, as well as of equipment,
supplies and techniques, and of institutional reform.
9 7
As is clear, both these steps would require direct
government intervention. However, though here the state
was expected to take a lead role as an agent of capitalism
and the Market generally, the kind of economy that such a
state superintended was deemed to be "Market-oriented"
rather than "communist." Though the state was expected
and encouraged to create and shape the "market" by policy
intervention it was considered a "Market-oriented" regime
in the development discourse.
This begs the question: what kind of orientation toward
the peasants and policy interventions could be labeled
"communist" during this pre-1980 period? It seems that
states that saw themselves as opposed to the "Market
Model" too, ended up suggesting similar solutions and
policy interventions.9 8 This was because such states also
basically accepted the same thesis of the "peasant society"
or "natural economy." 99 It would seem, therefore, that what
distinguished between states that were considered "market
oriented" and those that were not at this time, was not
whether a state intervened in the economy by use of policy
instruments or not. This was because it was widely
accepted that such intervention was necessary. Historically,
this is the path that the development discourse took-and
the construction of the "Market" in this discourse is not
affected by veracity or otherwise of the "peasant economy"
or "natural economy" thesis. Indeed, as I will argue in Part
IV, the very contestation of this that occurred in the
discourse itself provided a necessary turn that facilitated a
97. Malenbaum, supra note 83, at 22, 24.
98. See, e.g., HYDEN, supra note 94, at 31. Although Tanzania's first
President, Julius K. Nyerere, explicitly rejected "capitalism" as the method of
development and instead embraced "Ujamaa" (African Socialism), the approach
to the role of the state in capturing the surplus produced by the peasants was
the same. See LOUISE FORTMANN, PEASANTS, OFFICIALS AND PARTICIPATION IN
RURAL TANZANIA: EXPERIENCE WITH VILLAGIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION 107
(1980).
99. See FORTMANN, supra note 98, at 94.
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change in the meaning of the market in the 1980s. 100 Robert
Bates argues, for example, that both the peasant and moral
economy models seriously undervalued the role of the state
in shaping the so-called pre-capitalist societies. 101 He
contests the view that pre-capitalist societies have a
preference for subsistence and therefore frustrate the
growth of markets and capitalism through state agency. 102
Rather, he argues, the correct argument runs in the
opposite direction. It is the operation of Market forces as
shaped by the state that induces the peasants to produce in
the subsistence economy as their means of evading the
predator state. 0 3
The argument on the construction of the Market does
not depend on what side one takes in this debate. 04 The
fundamental point here is that one's own view of the issue
does not influence the main argument here which is that it
was the construction of the Market as the opposite of
communism during this era that was the important axis for
differentiation between "Market-oriented" and "non-
Market-oriented" regimes. In this period, therefore, the
Market existed more as a political icon.10 5 After all the
attraction of the Market as a model was significantly
dampened by Keynesian consensus that held that markets
were best not left alone. 06
Hence, the second justification for an expanded role of
the government in spurring economic development in
developing countries was based on economic theories that
called attention to the "hidden potential" of economic
development in less-developed regions, and the necessity of
a concerted and substantial "push" from the government to
100. See Bates, supra note 89, at 19; see also infra Part IV.
101. Bates, supra note 89, at 3.
102. Id. at 48.
103. Id.
104. I would express initial agreement with Robert Bates's position, but
with the proviso that not all so called peasant characteristics are based on the
evasion of the predator state. Additionally, the construction of peasant
characteristics as "rational" or "market-compatible" may, at times, involve both
stereotyping and exaggeration of "market characteristics" and "peasant
characteristics."
105. Carrier, supra note 12, at 1.
106. Id.
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create an entire industrial structure.10 7 As Paul Rosenstein-
Rodan, a prominent development economist, argued:
Social overhead capital is the most important instance of
indivisibility and hence of external economies on the supply side.
Its services are indirectly productive and become available only
after long gestation periods. Its most important products are
investment opportunities created in other industries. Social
overhead capital comprises all those basic industries like power,
transport, or communications which must precede the more
quickly yielding, directly productive investments and which
constitute the framework or infrastructure and the overhead costs
of the economy as a whole. Its installations are characterized by a
sizeable initial lump and low variable costs. Since the minimum
size in these basic industries is large, excess capacity will be
unavoidable over the initial period in underdeveloped countries...
Since overall vision is required as well as a correct appraisal of
future development, programming is undoubtedly required in this
lumpy field. Normal market mechanisms will not provide an
optimum supply. 108
Such a "push," it was argued, would "launch a chain
reaction of virtuous circles and complementary investments
that would then ripple in many directions through the
economic system."'10 9
In any event, both the New Deal in the United States
and the Marshall Plan in Europe were based on strong
interventions by the state in the market place. 110
Furthermore, the now celebrated uses of various policy
instruments in helping Europe and the United States
recover from the slump in the 1930s and in the post-war
107. See P.N. Rosenstein-Rodan, Problems of Industrialization of Eastern
and South-Eastern Europe, 53 ECON. J. 202, 204-07 (1943).
108. Id.
109. JAMES M. CYPHER & JAMES L. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 137 (1997).
110. See id. at 135-36. As H. Kwasi Prempeh has written:
From the West, the impressive post war reconstruction of Europe
under the Marshall Plan and the success of New Deal interventionism
in rescuing the United States from the Depression went to reinforce the
belief, widespread in postcolonial society, that the state had the
superior capacity-and a duty-to organize and lead economic
development.
H. Kwasi Prempeh, Marbury in Africa: Judicial Review and the Challenge of
Constitutionalism in Contemporary Africa, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1239, 1262 (2006).
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periods respectively were both understood to be "Market-
driven." '111 As elaborated in Part IV, it was a strong
counter-movement in the 1980s that changed the discourse
and changed the way people think about the Market at
least with respect to economic development. The Market
would no longer be only a political label or icon-but would
also be a prescriptive model.
The most important thing to remember about the state
interventions of the pre-1980 era is that they were aimed at
complementing the Market-not replacing it. The policy
instruments selected for intervention were therefore aimed
at promoting the extension of the Market. 112 As Colin Leys
writes: "The goal of development was growth; the agent of
development was the state and the means of development
were . . . macroeconomic policy instruments."'113 The effect
of this was the highlighting of the role of state intervention
in extending the Market during this period. The global
political economy, and the prevailing Market discourse,
however, made it possible, even necessary, to frame the
debate in terms of Market capitalism in contra-distinction
with socialism or central planning. As we have noted,
however, the framing of this discourse stifled the fact that
both state interventionism and market individualism were
present at both extremes representing these two models of
development. I end with the following quotation that
illustrates that this realization-that state interventionism
is not necessarily in opposition to Market individualism,
111. See, e.g., Alan Brinkley, The New Deal and the Idea of the State, in THE
RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER 1930-1980, at 85, 96-100 (Steve Fraser
& Gary Gerstle eds., 1989) (arguing that President Roosevelt justified new
government economic protections for workers as beneficial to business,
reflecting a shift toward what would become known as Keynesian economic
ideas). See generally JASON SCOTT SMITH, BUILDING NEW DEAL LIBERALISM: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC WORKS 1933-1956 (2006) (providing a historical
study of the role of the federal government in the New Deal economic
development and New Deal liberalism); ELIZABETH BORGWARDT, A NEW DEAL
FOR THE WORLD: AMERICA'S VISION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 286-87 (2005) (arguing
that President Roosevelt's diplomacy after the Second World War was based on
an expansive notion of expanding the American New Deal to the whole world).
Borgwardt writes that in the 1940s and 1950s, the United States promoted a
global Keynesianism as "part of Roosevelt's vision of a New Deal for the World."
Id. at 286.
112. See Gerald Berthound, Market, in THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY: A
GUIDE TO KNOWLEDGE AS POWER 70, 73 (Wolfgang Sachs ed., 1992).
113. COLIN LEYS, THE RISE & FALL OF DEVELOPMENT THEORY 7 (1996).
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and may indeed be in aid of it-had been noted as early as
1965:
[A]ll existing economic systems have some degree of planning by
central authorities and some degree of latitude for decisions by the
individual[s] [in the market].
For example, even in communist China-probably the most
intensively planned and rigidly controlled economy on the planet-
workers and farmers have some scope of choice in determining
what, when and how they will produce and consume. Conversely,
even in the United States--certainly the world's freest, most
competitive and most dynamic market economy-planning
decisions by government agencies in the fields of defense,
education, health, transportation, resource development, etc.,
account for 20 percent of gross national product, with an
additional unknown percentage produced by the private sector
under the deliberate stimulus of fiscal, monetary, social welfare,
agricultural and other government policies. Every country-
developed and less developed, private enterprise and state
socialist--can be located somewhere along a continuum which
ranges from comprehensive and detailed planning by the national
authorities of all significant aspects of economic activity to major
reliance upon decentralized nongovernmental decision making in
accordance with market conditions as influenced by government
policies.1
14
In other words, the difference between state
interventionism and market capitalism is only one of the
degrees of relative planning. As William Kapp wrote in
1973:
If economic planning plays such an important role in
contemporary society, the question may well be asked: What is the
difference between planning under 'capitalism' and planning
under 'socialism'? The most noticeable difference between
planning under capitalism and socialist planning seems to lie in
the degree to which the functions of decision-making in the field of
production and investment are actually exercised by public
authorities instead of by private producers.
Nor can the difference between government planning under
capitalism and socialism be found in the nature of the objectives of
the planning decision .... In short, whether national economic
planning is directed toward economic development and
114. Theodore Geiger, Economic Decision Making by Planners and by the
Market, in INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1965, supra note 83, at 67, 67-68.
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industrialization, the preparation of adequate means of defense,
the maintenance of full employment or the provision of a
maximum of present consumers' goods will depend upon historical
circumstances which have nothing to do with the nature of
planning. It is misleading to identify economic planning with any
of these possible objectives.
11 5
IV. THE MARKET IN DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE AFTER 1980
In the early 1980s, three significant events took place
that helped influence a change in the meaning of the
Market in the development discourse. First, in the early
1980s there was a shift to the right in Western political
regimes.116 This began with the election of Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher in Britain in 1979 and that of President
Ronald Reagan in the United States in 1980. Both Thatcher
and Reagan began what is commonly referred to as the
"Conservative Revolution": an economic program that relied
on monetarist policies, tax reductions, privatization,
deregulation, and the operation of market forces. It was not
long before this "Conservative Revolution" started
informing the foreign policies of both the United States and
Britain. Second, this "Conservative Revolution" was
followed by the victory of the anti-communist forces in
Eastern Europe toward the end of that decade. 117 Third, the
debt crisis in the "Third World" exploded. This started with
Mexico's sudden inability to meet its obligations in August
1982.118 Soon thereafter, Argentina, Brazil, and then a host
115. K. William Kapp, Economic Planning and Freedom, in DEVELOPMENT:
PERSPECTIVES AND PROBLEMS 17, 19-20 (i. A. Oommen ed., 1973).
116. See generally A CONSERVATIVE REVOLUTION?: THE THATCHER-REAGAN
DECADE IN PERSPECTIVE (Andrew Adonis & Tim Hames eds., 1994).
117. The fall of communism in east and central Europe brought to the fore
questions about the role of the state and markets in fostering economic
development and the relationship between democracy and market capitalism.
See ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (1991); Claus Offe, Capitalism
by Democratic Design?: Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East
Central Europe, 58 Soc. RES. 865 (1991).
118. See Lee C. Buchheit, A Quarter Century of Sovereign Debt
Management: An Overview, 35 GEO. J. INT'L L. 637, 637 (2004) ("The global debt
crisis of the 1980s is generally thought to have begun on August 22, 1982, when
Mexico formally requested its commercial bank lenders to begin rolling over the
maturing principal of their loans to Mexican public sector borrowers.").
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of other developing countries followed suit.119
As many analysts recognized, the sovereign debt
problem was not just a problem of liquidity for developing
countries: the situation threatened the solvency of major
financial institutions in the United States and Europe. 1
20
"In the early 1970s, the sharp increases in the price of oil
created a demand for credit in oil-importing countries that
the commercial banks, flush with deposits from oil-surplus
nations, were able and willing to fulfill.' 121 The second oil
shock of 1979-80 unleashed a series of reactions in the
capital markets that had a dire impact on the developing
countries that were net oil importers and had commercial
loans to repay.122 A sudden, sharp tightening of monetary
policies by industrial states pushed interest rates for the
Third World sovereign loans to sky rocketing proportions.
With most of the Third World commercial credits carrying
floating interest rates, the real debt burden of these
countries quickly reflected these onerous conditions. 23 The
consequence was that the ratios of debt service to exports
and to General National Product (GNP) of most Third
World countries rose sharply at a time when the
commercial loans were no longer willing or able to provide
further credit to facilitate gradual adjustment.124 However,
this problem would not only affect Third World countries.
As already intimated, the banking sectors in the industrial
countries were threatened with bankruptcy. The loans
extended to the Third World had far exceeded the resources
of the major "money center" banks. A mere disruption, let
alone mere inability to pay by the Third World countries,
threatened very substantial losses for these banks.
25
119. See RICHARD PEET ET AL., UNHOLY TRINITY: THE IMF, WORLD BANK AND
WTO 74-75 (2003).
120. See, e.g., SUSAN GEORGE, A FATE WORSE THAN DEBT 29-31 (1990); PEET
ET AL., supra note 119, at 76-77; Peter H. Lindert, Response to Debt Crisis: What
is Different About the '80s?, in THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 227 (Barry Eichengreen & Peter H. Lindert eds., 1989).
121. Richard E. Feinberg, The Adjustment Imperative and U.S. Policy, in
ADJUSTMENT CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD 3, 6-7 (Richard E. Feinberg &
Valeriana Kallab eds., 1984).
122. See id. at 7.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See Albert Fishlow, The Debt Crisis: Round Two Ahead?, in ADJUSTMENT
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Outside the banking sector, demands for goods produced by
the United States and other industrial countries were
declining as a result of the declining foreign exchange for
most Third World countries. Countries had used their
borrowed money to buy imports from the United States and
other industrial countries. After the oil shock of 1973, "this
demand had helped to stabilize the world economy and to
limit recession in the North."126
These three events coupled with the disintegration of
the Keynesian consensus, generated two separate discourses
that eventually facilitated a shift in the meaning of the
Market as applied in the development discourse. 127 Both
discourses, aimed to curtail the role of government in
economic development as had been advocated for in the pre-
1980 period. 128 First, there was the "rent-seeking discourse"
CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD, supra note 121, at 32.
126. Id.
127. The Keynesian "consensus faded in the 1970s for a number of reasons,
arguably including the very success of that older consensus in generating
economic security." Carrier, supra note 12, at 1. The second Oil Crisis had also
given the Bretton Woods Institutions unprecedented powers and influence over
developing countries' economies. These institutions, in turn, used their
influence to champion the definition and approach to the market that they
preferred. The stranglehold that the Bretton Woods institutions got over
developing countries' economies happened as follows. After the first oil shock,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) set up the "oil facility" in 1974 to help
oil-importing countries to adjust to the higher oil prices. The oil facility,
however, also served two other important roles. First, it offered member
countries policy advice on how to adjust to their payment positions. Later on, it
started stipulating policy conditions for disbursement of loans. Second,
governments, banks and other creditors started treating the IMF and World
Bank endorsement of a country's adjustment policies as a "seal of approval." For
example, in August 2000, the IMF approved a three-year Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility (PRGF) credit to Kenya totaling SDR150 million (about
US$198 million) to "support the nation's economic and structural reform
program." Press Release, International Monetary Fund, IMF Approves Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility (1) Loan for Kenya (July 28, 2000), available at
http://www.africanation.org/docsOO/kenO08i.htm. This was the first loan to
Kenya since 1997 when the IMF and other donors stopped dealing with the
Kenya government until key economic and political reforms were instituted.
This news encouraged donor flows to the country. The Paris Club approved a
debt rescheduling in November 2000. In sum, the IMF loan was expected to
unlock about US$300 million (Ksh23.4 billion) from the fund and other lenders,
including the World Bank, the European Union, and Britain that had tied their
budgetary support to the IMF. See Dancing in Kenya to the Donors' Tune,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 5, 2000, at 43.
128. See supra Part III.
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that generally focused on the costliness of government
intervention in the economy. 129 The common thread in this
discourse is the belief that the slow progress made by
developing countries in development is caused by excessive
economic interventions by their governments. 130  This
discourse argues that the costs of these interventions have
been typically higher than their benefits in terms of both
production and distribution. 13 According to this discourse,
market failure is a result of, rather than a justification for
intervention by governments in the market. 32 An analysis
of the costs of intervention-both direct and indirect-leads
to the conclusion that markets are best left alone. 133 For
solutions to the development crisis, this discourse over-
whelmingly favors "Market-oriented" principles, meaning
those that in the short-run would achieve allocative
efficiency and long-run growth and development will
emerge eventually. 134 Since this discourse identified itself
as being strongly pro-free trade and pro-market, it followed
that its analysis of the costs of intervention seriously
undercut the earlier discourse, also associated with being
129. Among the key texts in this discourse, I would include: BELA BALASSA,
THE STRUCTURE OF PROTECTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1971); BELA
BALASSA, DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES IN SEMI-INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES (1982); P.T.
BAUER, EQUALITY, THE THIRD WORLD AND ECONOMIC DELUSION (1981); JAGDISH
BHAGWATI, FOREIGN TRADE REGIMES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: ANATOMY
AND CONSEQUENCES OF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES (1978); ANNE 0. KRUEGER,
FOREIGN TRADE REGIMES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: LIBERALIZATION
ATTEMPTS AND CONSEQUENCES (1978); DEEPAK LAL, THE POVERTY OF
'DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS' (1983); Anne Krueger, The Political Economy of the
Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974).
130. See Krueger, supra note 129, at 291.
131. See Colclough, supra note 51, at 6.
132. See id. at 7-8.
133. There are three costs of government intervention that are discussed in
the literature. First is the direct cost of the intervention in terms of wages and
salaries of the employees of the intervening bureaucratic agency. Second is the
indirect cost brought about by the distortion of the relative prices elsewhere in
the economy consequent upon, for example, the revenue raising measures to
finance the intervention. Third is the distortion caused by the "scarcity rent"
created by the intervention. Scarcity rent is the income which a holder of a
license in a regulated economy can extract because of the difference between the
value of an imported good at world prices and its costs in terms of the over-
valued domestic currency. See Joel M. Ngugi, Policing Neo-Liberal Reforms: The
Rule of Law as an Enabling and Restrictive Discourse, 26 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.




pro-market, but that supported interventions in the market
by the government for a variety of reasons.
Second, there was a parallel discourse that attacked the
role of the state but not based on the efficiency costs of the
acts of intervention themselves. This discourse can itself be
divided into two. The common theme of the two strands is
their analysis of the argument that states are capable or
willing, politically, to intervene in the market in order to
benefit general development goals. 13 5 One strand used a
Marxist framework to show that it was naive to imagine
that some reformist states would institute reforms or laws
aimed at capturing surpluses for the general welfare of the
country. 136 Such reformism, this strand argued, would be
impossible since it would eventually mean that it was
against more income gains for the owners of capital.1 37 This
view argued that the state is not a neutral arbiter that
would automatically enforce a socially efficient development
plan based on a transfer of resources from the rural areas to
the industrial sector and then back to the rest of the
economy. In short, the neo-Marxists argued that the state
could not form an alliance with the rural peasants to the
detriment of the owners of capital that maintained it in
power.
The second strand used a non-Marxist framework to
argue that governments perpetually aim to reward those
alliances that keep them in power. 138 The pattern of state
interventions represented the terms of a political pact
among organized political interests, the costs of which are
transferred to unorganized interests who are excluded from
the price-setting coalition. Members of the political pact are
organized labor, industry, and government. Small-scale
farmers constitute its victims and large-scale farmers stand
as passive allies politically neutralized through subsidy
135. See ROBERT BATES, MARKETS AND STATES IN TROPICAL AFRICA (1981)
(making the argument that the political elites pursued the development policies
they did, not because they believed that they would produce superior results for
the state as a whole, but because these policies enabled them to survive
politically).
136. See, e.g., COLIN LEYS, UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN KENYA: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF NEO-COLONIALISM 1964-1971 (1975); Colin Leys, The Politics of
Redistribution with Growth, IDS BULL., Aug. 1975, at 4.
137. See LEYS, supra note 136.
138. See generally BATES, supra note 135.
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programs in agriculture. 139 It was therefore unrealistic to
imagine that developing countries' governments would
undercut the income gains of its industrial classes that
were initially supported by over-taxing the rural areas by
capturing their surplus and redistributing it for investment
purposes. 140 In short, the neo-institutionalists argued that
the state was consumed by the special interests that kept it
in power such that it had no incentive to use generated
surpluses for development.
It would seem that neither of these two strands of
critique is fatal to the pre-1980 development prescriptions
which privileged state intervention as discussed in Part III
above. Both of these post-1980 critiques point out important
practical limitations or obstacles but without revealing fatal
analytic "errors" of state interventionism. 141 There is no
evidence that these practical obstacles to the operational-
ization of the pre-1980 development paradigm cannot be
overcome. Indeed, Ashutosh Varshney has shown that it is
possible to intervene in the market in ways that are
consistent with both making the rural majority better off
and being in conformity with the special interests that
maintain a government in power. 142 The questions here
would be, for example, whether it is impossible to promote a
less doctrinaire form of import substitution spiced by
moderate, Market-oriented pricing policies as a successful
mode of development for developing countries. In other
words, is it possible to make agriculture more productive
(via technological investment) and [Theodore] Shultz-
induced productivity but transfer the surplus from agriculture
to finance general welfare-increasing industrialization
through taxation or terms of trade?143 Alice Amsden, for
139. See id.
140. See id.; see also ROBERT BATES, ESSAYS IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
RURAL AFRICA (1983).
141. See Colclough, supra note 51, at 4; see also JEAN-FRANQOIS BAYART, THE
STATE IN AFRICA: THE POLITICS OF THE BELLY (1993).
142. Ashutosh Varshney, Urban Bias in Perspective, in BEYOND URBAN BIAS
3 (Ashutosh Varshney ed., 1993); see also Richard Jolly, Redistribution with
Growth -A Reply, IDS BULL., Aug. 1975, at 9.
143. Theodore Shultz, who won the Economics Nobel prize in 1979, studied
the development potential of agriculture based on a disequilibrium approach.
His analytical interest was on the imbalance between relative poverty and
underdevelopment in agriculture compared with higher productivity and the
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example, asks if there is any way developing countries can
craft an import-substituting regime in a way that leads to
industrialization. She confirms in the case of the South
East Asian tigers, this happened. 144 Empirical studies like
that done by Amsden seem to confirm that the critiques of
government intervention in import substitution
industrialization (ISI) are only based on empirical analysis
of what has happened rather than principled or theoretical
rejection of government intervention and ISI based on its
analytical flaws or deficiency. 145
However, despite the possible responses to these
critiques as suggested above, the effect of these two sets of
arguments on the role of government intervention in
economic development, and consequently, the meaning of
the Market was substantial. The effect was to seriously
undercut the consensus that had emerged in the pre-1980
period about the need for governments to intervene in the
economy and the set of instruments that could be utilized in
higher income levels in industry and other urban economic activities. Schultz's
analysis of the development potential of agriculture is based on a disequilibrium
approach. He argued that the gap between, on the one hand, traditional
production methods, and on the other, the more effective methods now available
which create the conditions necessary for a dynamic development. Using this
approach, Schultz presented a detailed critique of the developing countries'
industrialization policies and their neglect of agriculture. He developed a model
that showed that investments in education can affect productivity in agriculture
as well as in the economy as a whole. THEODORE W. SHULTZ, AGRICULTURE IN AN
UNSTABLE ECONOMY (1945); THEODORE W. SHULTZ, PRODUCTION AND WELFARE OF
AGRICULTURE (1949). His most important book was THEODORE W. SHULTZ,
TRANSFORMING TRADITIONAL AGRICULTURE (1964).
144. ALICE H. AMSDEN, THE RISE OF "THE REST": CHALLENGES TO THE WEST
FROM LATE-INDUSTRIALIZING ECONOMIES (2001). Alice Amsden argues that the
"late-comers" in industrialization-for example, Brazil, China, Taiwan,
Singapore, Korea, Malaysia, etc.-used a series of intermediate assets to build
mid-technology industries, which, in turn produced enough stimulus to self-
sustain the industrialization through export. The intermediate assets are
subsidies, performance standards, result-oriented, and redistributive measures
for industries. All these "institutions" started as import substitution but were
crafted to circumvent, rather than obey the invisible hand of the market. The
use of these reciprocal "control" institutions, with an unlimited supply of labor
coupled with a number of regulatory policies akin to those used in import
substitution (e.g., tax breaks, industrial licensing, import licensing, etc.) had a
disciplining effect on the market. In other words, these countries developed
precisely by choosing winners, and not letting the invisible hand evolve
"naturally." Id.
145. This would apply alike to critiques by neo-institutionalists like Robert
Bates, neo-Marxists like Colin Leys, and neo-liberals like Deepak Lal.
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that intervention. Without such a consensus, the meaning
of what constituted "pro-Market" policies or "Market-
oriented" policies changed. In this atmosphere, another
aspect of the Market that had always remained beneath the
surface and in the background started gaining currency.
This is the association of the market with limited
government libertarianism and freedom.
146
The foregrounding of this aspect of the market was, to a
large extent, inspired and shaped by the ideas of Friedrich
Hayek. I4 7 Hayek's main idea is that the Market is a
spontaneously ordered institution that culturally evolves in
the same way that the institutions of language and
morality evolve.' 48 Like their counterparts in the physical
world like crystals, snowflakes, or galaxies, the market is
not the product of intelligent design. Hayek therefore
characterizes the market as the result of human actions
over many generations, and not the result of human design.
He therefore emphasizes price mechanism in "free markets"
as the only mechanism that conveys accurate information
about supply and demand. 4 9 As a result, Hayek's
liberalism emphasizes methodological individualism-
Homo economicus, based on assumptions of individuality,
rationality, self-interest-and the doctrine of spontaneous
order. During the decade of the 1980s, Ronald Reagan and
Margaret Thatcher adopted Hayek's brand of liberalism to
legitimate wide-ranging attacks on "big government" and
the welfare state. 50  As I will point out below,
146. This was a radical but marginal view in economics and philosophy
since the early 1930s. It started acquiring influence and repute from the late
1970s with the rise of the New Right in England. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE
ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944) [herinafter THE RoAD TO SERFDOM]; FRIEDRICH A.
HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1949) [hereinafter INDIVIDUALISM
AND ECONOMIC ORDER]; FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY
(1960). Other key writings that are considered antecedents of this view of the
market, now associated with neo-liberalism include JAMES M. BUCHANAN &
GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962) and MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM (1962).
147. Friedrich Hayek is considered one of the most important thinkers of
the twentieth century. He won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974.
148. INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 146; THE ROAD TO
SERFDOM, supra note 146.
149. THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, supra note 146.
150. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Hoover, The Rise of Conservative Capitalism:
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internationally, the philosophy was adopted by the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, in what has
come to be known as the '"Washington Consensus," and used
to justify structural adjustment programs in developing
countries.151
The basic philosophy is "anti-design": all decisions on
the economy ought to be left to the individual units of the
economy-enterprises, workers, farmers, investors, or
consumers. 152  Since this form of liberalism rejects
interference with process, it is hostile to the idea of a design
or plan for a society. To this extent, it is anti-utopian.1 53
Society should not have any fixed goals-process should
determine outcome. This is exemplified by opposition to
Communist centrally-planned economies, and support for
deregulation. 154  There is no distinction, for example,
Ideological Tensions within the Reagan and Thatcher Governments, 29 COMP.
STUD. Soc'Y & HIST. 245 (1987). As Orlan Lee writes:
Hayek's views in economic theory had been influential in the early
1930s, but lost ground to Keynes's, as the latter's theories for
recovering from the great depression and financing World War II
became dominant. The current widespread interest in Hayek's work in
economic theory and his latter contributions is a very recent
phenomenon. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration in the United
States and the Thatcher government in Britain openly avowed the free-
market economic ideas of Hayek and of Milton Friedman for combating
the results of the inflationary policies of the 1970s, and the
mismanagement that often followed nationalization of industry-
because national or social interests are not identical with the economic
interests of sound enterprise.
Orlan Lee, The Law of a Free Society Emerges Like the Laws of Economics: F.A.
Hayek from The Road to Serfdom to Law, Religion & Liberty, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. &
LIBERTY 17, 33 (2005). Margaret Thatcher herself wrote: "Our inspiration [for
her economic policies] was . ..Hayek's powerful Road to Serfdom [among
others]. ... Such books ... provided crisp, clear analytical arguments against
socialism...." MARGARET THATCHER, THE DOWNING STREET YEARS 12-13 (1993).
151. See Williamson, supra note 35.
152. See F. A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 96
(1967); Lee, supra note 150, at 23-24.
153. See HAYEK, supra note 152; Lee, supra note 150, at 23-24.
154. Therefore, a necessary corollary to the Hayekian liberalism is the
social-Darwinist beliefs about the necessity of intense competition, and
arguments about the moral necessity of market forces in the economy. However,
despite the claims of this form of liberalism that the form of society should
strictly be the outcome of processes, and that it rejects the idea of design for the
market, other liberals, using similar logic claim that eventually, the form of
human organization and interaction that is the "best human form of
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between health or education services and other market
products; they all can be traded in the marketplace.
Similarly, there is no distinction between the operating of
an industrialized economy and a developing or Third World
one. Therefore, there are no structural reasons to suppose
that the size and role of government should be different in
the developing and industrialized societies. 155
As a result of this shift, the Market in the development
discourse was now being defined in terms of absence of
certain regulatory regimes by states-and not by the extent
of intervention as was the case in the earlier era' At the
same time, the state was no longer considered able to
channel development in an efficient way. The Market, made
up of private individual actors, was extolled as the best
arbiter of economic resources. As Jacques Donzelot
remarked, the role of the state shifted from "a guarantor of
progress to a manager of destiny."156 As Alice Amsden wrote
about the Market-oriented reforms that swept Eastern
Europe in the 1980s:
In the East European case [as opposed to the late-industrial
capitalism of East Asia], the role of institutions has been minimal;
government" is the political democracy of the industrial countries. The
contradiction is that as this is the form of the "best organization" that man
could ever have, liberalism would consider it "just" to impose itself on the
society. In fact, since it is considered "freedom," it is not considered an
imposition in the first place. For the claim that liberalism is the best social
organization that man would ever achieve or conceive (and would therefore, be
the best design for the society). See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?,
NAT'L INT., Summer 1989, at 3. Fukuyama wrote:
What we may'be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the
passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history
as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and
the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of
human government .... The ideal that will govern the material world
in the long run.
Id. at 4; see also FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN
(1992). For a powerful critique of Fukuyama's thesis, see Susan Marks, The
End of History?: Reflections on Some International Legal Theses, 8 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 449 (1997). Susan Marks suggests that, though Fukuyama's views are easily
dismissed as "extremist," they are very similar to those of more moderate
liberal renewal narratives.
155. Colclough, supra note 51, at 18.
156. Jacques Donzelot, The Mobilization of Society, in THE FOUCAULT
EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 169, 176 (Graham Burchell et al. eds.,
1991).
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resource allocation has been left almost entirely to the market
mechanism. When advocates of this 'market fundamentalism' refer
to 'institutions' and the necessity of 'institution building' in order
to foster capitalism, they have in mind a strictly limited agenda:
the specification of property rights, contract law enforcement, and
the removal of impediments to private enterprise. 1
5 7
Preoccupation with regulatory regimes to capture
surplus for productive reinvestment turned to preoccupation
with freedom of contract and private property laws. The
design of welfare legislation and policy was replaced by
designs of "free markets." The desire to meet social goals of
development through government intervention was
replaced by the desire to get prices "right" as the overriding
concern of development policy. In other words, the
definition of the market changed:
The [market] is characterized by contract and property laws, and
tort and criminal laws to protect and secure the interests of
personality and of property. Under this scenario, law becomes an
arbiter over households and firms which, in an open market, act
and react to price signals and thus determine the mobilization and
allocation of resources through the market mechanism. 158
Hence, in the post-1980 era, the Market now was being
defined more in opposition to the state rather than as a
method of allocating investment resources that is enabled
by the government. And, whereas in the earlier (pre-1980)
era the state was thought of as the best institution or
bureaucratic form for channeling the surplus in the society
for development and growth purposes, in this new meaning,
it is the private/bureaucratic decisionmakers/forms that are
relied on for the mobilization and allocation of resources for
growth and development purposes.
V. EXPLAINING THE SHIFTS IN THE MEANING OF MARKET
The argument I made in Part IV is that a change in the
development discourse that occurred in the 1980s had the
effect of highlighting a particular meaning of the Market. A
change in the discourse can have the effect of drawing into
157. ALICE H. AMSDEN ET AL., THE MARKET MEETS ITS MATCH:
RESTRUCTURING THE ECONOMIES OF EASTERN EUROPE 4 (1989).
158. LAW MAKING AND DEVELOPMENT 27 (Seymour Haregot ed., 1987).
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question, debate, or contestation ("foregrounding"), an issue
that was hitherto in the "uncontested" background by the
application of the "Market." At the same time, a change in
the discourse may have the effect of "backgrounding" a
different issue that may have been in the foreground
contested (or uncontested) arena in a different period.159 It
is what is backgrounded or foregrounded in the Market and
economic development discourse that highlights a particular
aspect of the meaning of the Market. For example, as I
pointed out in Part IV, the two sets of arguments-one
highlighting the costliness of government intervention by
neo-liberals, and the other highlighting the apparent
incapability of government action to reinvest surplus for
development by neo-Institutionalists and neo-Marxists-
both had the effect of foregrounding aspects of government's
role in the economy that were hitherto in the contested
background. Similarly, the highlighting of the association of
the Market with notions of individualism, liberty, and
freedom was foregrounding aspects of the Market that had
always been contested in the background. The three
discourses, however, in their effect resulted in a shift in the
development discourse and the way the meaning of the
Market was constructed in the new discourse.
A. The Analogy of U.S. Constitutional Jurisprudence
These shifts in the meaning of the Market can be
analogized to the philosophical shift that occurred in the
New Deal line of cases in the U.S. Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 160 According to Lessig's "fidelity theory,"
159. My understanding in this regard is indebted to Professor Lawrence
Lessig's "fidelity theory" in American Constitutional law. Lawrence Lessig,
Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395
(1995); see also infra, Part V.A.
160. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, passed in 1868, reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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constitutional interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court
cycles between two modes of interpretation-one textualist
and the other "translation."'16 1 The shifts in the cycles are in
response to the constraints of contestability of the
underlying discourse. 162 Hence, as to which technique is
applicable or usable in a given context, will be determined
by the social reality vide the constraint of contestability. 163
Descriptively, the textualist technique simply reads a
text according to the relatively simple rules of interpretation
and simply applies its understanding of the text to the
context. 164 It aims at finding a reading that coheres best
with what is now understood to be the case. However, many
changes occur that render the original structure differently.
This necessitates a reading, an attempt by the Court to re-
craft the theory/methodology to preserve the original design
as envisaged by the framers. This is the second mode called
"translation."'' 65 But this cannot explain the very radical
shifts that sometimes occur in constitutional law and which
are not necessarily explained by these first two variables.
This brings in the third factor-the constraining factor-
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
The literal meaning of this clause suggests that a state has to use
sufficiently fair and just legal procedures whenever it lawfully takes away a
persons life, freedom or possessions. It would therefore appear that, on its face,
this clause only guarantees procedural or "process" rights. However, under
"Substantive Due Process," the Supreme Court has developed a broader
interpretation of the Clause, one that protects basic substantive rights, as well
as the right to process. The doctrine of Substantive Due Process holds that the
Due Process Clause not only requires "due process," that is, basic procedural
rights, but that it also protects basic substantive rights. "Substantive" rights
are those general rights that reserve to the individual the power to possess or to
do certain things, despite the government's desire to the contrary. These are
rights like freedom of speech and religion. "Procedural" rights are special rights
that, instead, dictate how the government can lawfully go about taking away a
person's freedom or property or life, when the law otherwise gives them the
power to do so.
161. Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995
SuP. CT. REV. 125, 127-28 [hereinafter Lessig, Translating Federalism]; see also
Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993).
162. See Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note 161, at 127-28.
163. Id. at 176-80.
164. Id. at 130-31.
165. Id. at 134-35.
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contestability. 166 Even when the Court believes that it has
done the above two, it will be constrained by a certain social
reality and the shifting of what is contestable or not will
determine how the court reacts. 16
7
Normatively, while the textualist technique is constrained
by both the text and the context, the translation technique
is constrained by a conception of interpretive fidelity-
ordinarily expressed in the mnemonic device "facts, not
values, change.' 168 However, the third variable offers a
more interesting expos6. It constrains the second technique
by a fundamental requirement that the Court must avoid
actions that appear, in context, political. 169 This explains
the institutional limitations of the Court in taking various
issues "for granted," deciding the "off-the-tableness" of
some, and the "up-for-grabness" of some.
170
As Professor Lessig urges, using this theory, it is
possible to read the shift in interpretation of the U.S.
Constitution that occurred in 1937 as a result of a change in
the "uncontested" background. I am referring here to the
apparently radical shift in constitutional interpretation
that occurred in interpreting the New Deal legislation
around 1937.171 The radical change occurred around 1937
166. Id. at 176-80.
167. Id.
168. See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Federalism's Text, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1218 (1998).
169. Id. at 1221. Professor Lessig calls this the "Frankfurter Constraint."
170. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1365, 1393 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, The Puzzling Persistence of Bellbottom
Theory: What a Constitutional Theory Should Be, 85 GEO. L.J. 1837, 1846-47
(1997).
171. The New Deal line of cases should really be seen in the general context
of the Court's jurisprudence on the Commerce Clause and federalism. The
legacy of the Marshall trilogy (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)) was
that Congress had power over objects either in, or affecting interstate
commerce. The "Necessary and Proper" clause was interpreted (in my view
wrongly, but that is irrelevant here) as meaning that Congress was permitted to
use whatever means are sufficient to achieve an end. (The Court could easily
have interpreted the clause to mean Congress was restricted to using
"necessary means" only to achieve legitimate ends.) However, the effect was to
deliver to Congress the power to do whatever it wants to effect its legitimate
constitutional purposes-a carte blanche for the federal government to encroach
on the States' domain in exercise of powers unanticipated by the framers.
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with a series of three cases that overturned earlier Supreme
Court thinking on the Commerce Clause and substantive
due process provisions. The three cases are as follows: First,
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin held that Congress can regulate
a manufacturer if the manufacturer's activity significantly
affects interstate commerce. 172 Second, Wickard v. Filburn
held that Congress can regulate individual home production
of wheat and use of a major interstate commodity based on
the substantial effect of the aggregate of such activity. 173
Third, United States v. Darby held that Congress can
establish and enforce wage and hour standards for the
manufacture of goods for interstate commerce. 174 These
cases directly overturned the earlier cases that sought to
trammel Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause
using formal distinctions such as manufacturing versus
commerce and indirect versus direct control. 75
The last few cases in this line included the following:
Hammer v. Dagenhart had held that Congress cannot
prohibit the transportation in interstate commerce of goods
manufactured by child labor on the grounds that Congress
does not have general police power and therefore cannot use
the Commerce Clause to prohibit trade in goods that are
themselves harmless. 176 Schechter Poultry had held that
Congress cannot regulate intrastate commerce that has
Ultimately, however, this expansion of the Necessary and Proper Clause and
the evisceration of any restraint it may have otherwise placed on federal
government went too far. The "Old Court" adorned with the armor of
constitutional fidelity and framers' vision took upon themselves the task of
restoring the "original" balance. Since a textualist reading of the Constitution
would yield an unwelcome result, the "Old Court" simply translated the
constitution text to render a reading they preferred. As expected, this could go
on only for so long. It soon became untenable and with the New Deal pressures
flat on the Court's face, it beat a hasty retreat back to textualist rendering of
the Constitutional text. One may argue that there is another attempt at
"translating" with the Rehnquist Court (witness decisions such as United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) and Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976)). It is an attempt to imply certain limitations on the federal government
even when these are not found in the constitutional text.
172. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
173. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 133 (1942).
174. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123 (1941).
175. See Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note 161, at 144-54.
176. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 281 (1918); see U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
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only an indirect effect on interstate commerce. 177 Finally,
Carter Coal had held that Congress cannot regulate the
hours, wages, and other employment conditions of a
national industry.
178
Most constitutional commentators characterize this
shift as an unconstitutional, and a possibly cowardly
response by the Supreme Court to Roosevelt's "court packing
scheme."'7 9 Others see it as a non-textual but popularly
legitimate constitutional amendment. 80 However, Professor
Lessig argues, in line with the "fidelity theory," that the
New Deal shift represents translation, both of fact-"uncontested" economic discourse-and of structure-
understandings of the political basis of law.' 8 ' In other
words, a shift in the economic discourse rendered certain
issues canvassed in the New Deal line of cases "uncontested."
It is "[t]his uncontested context [that] has a critical effect on
interpretation . . . [as it provides] the range of readings of
fealty in an unchanged text.'
18 2
B. The Market and the Changing Discourses that Determine
Its Meaning in the Development Discourse
In the nineteenth century, the major discourse
constructing the Market privileged unregulated economic
activities. 8 3 This discourse constructed the meaning of the
Market in terms of absence of regulations-but did not
reveal the fact that the Market itself was the outcome of a
177. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546
(1935).
178. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 309 (1936).
179. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power,
73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1443 (1987); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 308-15 (2d. 1988).
180. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 119-21
(1991).
181. Lessig, supra note 159, at 453 (arguing that the "switch in time" that
occurred in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), was a valid
constitutional "translation" that recognized changes in the economic, social, and
intellectual realities and trends necessitating a reconsideration of the continued
viability of the constitutional doctrines based on facts as they existed in an
earlier period).
182. Id. at 472.
183. See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 33-34 (1957).
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"conscious and often violent intervention on the part of
government which imposed the market organization on
society for noneconomic ends."' 8 4 A change in the Market
discourse took place, however, in the industrialized North
as a result of the rise of the "social" consciousness and
sociological jurisprudence towards the end of the nineteenth
century and during the first few decades of the twentieth
century. 8 5 This was the mass social reaction against
Market rationality across Europe and in the United States
which, among other things, led to a reconceptualization of
the legitimate social purposes of state power and its
exercise to alter market relations for the sake of stabilizing
the capitalist system. This was fueled by the idea of social
embeddedness that evolved during this era.18 6 This is the
idea that social relations are based not primarily on
principles of autonomy and individualism as full-blown
market capitalism would hold, but on the notion of
solidarity. 8 7 The consequence of this rise of the "social
ethos" in the midst of capitalist legal regimes is what Karl
Polanyi refers to as the "double movement": the institution
and spread of markets coupled with a corresponding
"network of measures and policies . . . integrated into
powerful institutions designed to check the action of the
market relative to labor, land, and money."'88
The industrial revolution had spawned great wealth,
but had also produced countless number of people who were
poor and destitute. The millions of people who had flocked
to overcrowded and disordered cities were a recipe for chaos
that threatened to disrupt the industrial revolution and the
unregulated market that had been its base. 8 9 It thus
became important to "manage" poverty in order to save the
184. Id. at 250; see also Duncan Kennedy, Two Globalizations of Law &
Legal Thought: 1850-1968, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 631, 648-51 (2003)
[hereinafter Kennedy, Two Globalizations]; Duncan Kennedy, The
Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Rationality, or Max Weber's
Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought,
55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1033-35 (2004) [hereinafter Kennedy, Disenchantment].
185. See POLANYI, supra note 183.
186. See id. at 57; see also Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social
Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 491 (1985).
187. See generally LEON DUGUIT, LAW IN THE MODERN STATE (1919).
188. POLANYI, supra note 183, at 76.
189. See id. at 74-76, 280.
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economic liberalism that had produced it. As Duncan
Kennedy writes:
But the social people were anti-Marxist, just as much as they were
anti-laissez faire. Their goal was to save Liberalism from itself.
Their basic idea was that the conditions of late nineteenth-century
life represented a social transformation, consisting of urbanization,
industrialization, organizational society, globalization of markets,
all summarized in the idea of 'interdependence.' Because the will
theory was individualist, it ignored interdependence and endorsed
particular legal rules that permitted anti-social behavior of many
kinds. The crises of the modern factory (industrial accidents) and
the urban slum (pauperization), and later the crisis of the financial
markets, all derived from the failure of coherently individualist
law to respond to the coherently social needs of modern conditions
of interdependence. From this 'is' analysis, they derived the 'ought'
of a reform program, one that was astonishingly successful and
globalized even more effectively than classical legal thought,
through many of the same mechanisms, but also because the social
became the ideology of many third-world nationalist elites. There
was labor legislation, the regulation of urban areas through
landlord/tenant, sanitary, and zoning regimes, the regulation of
financial markets, and the development of new institutions of
international law. 190
The turmoil created by the unregulated Market
presented an opportunity to both prevent rampant chaos in
the cities but also presented an opportunity for the
government to intervene in the everyday lives of people as a
welfare agency. 191 This whole realm of intervention could be
manipulated by the state for different purposes-one of
which could be to ensure that the capitalist or Market
system remained undisrupted. 192
Eventually, this idea of the "social" in the Market
influenced conceptions of what the state needed to do in
developing countries to bring about the "Great
190. Kennedy, Disenchantment, supra note 184, at 1034-35.
191. See POLANYI, supra note 183, at 280.
192. See Arturo Escobar, Planning, in THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY 132
(Wolfgang Sachs ed., 1992). Karl Polanyi has also argued that the "Poor Laws"
in England was a systematic aid-in-wages, reputed to be pandering to the
whims of the poor while actually depressing their wages under the subsistence
level. The legal regime for "Poor Laws" was, for example, coupled with a special
anti-trade union law and elaborate subsidies for the industrialists. See POLANYI,
supra note 183, at 280.
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Transformation" 193 in these societies. 194 As we saw in Part
III, the overall aim remained one of extending the Market
as the primary allocator of investment resources-but it
was realized that the state had to play a role in enabling
the Market. As indicated in the writings of modernizers
(like Wilfred Malenbaum quoted above), the concept of the
"social" was broadened in the development discourse to
include the task of "transforming the traditional sector" as
part of the government's role in managing poverty and
underdevelopment. 195 M.A.G. van Meerhaeghe, writing in
1966 about the challenge facing international economic
institutions, remarked that in many states, "further
economic growth calls for a change in mentality. The
conservatism and illiteracy of the agricultural population
often prove an obstacle to any progress in that sector.'1 96
Similarly, a group of experts convened by the United
Nations had, earlier, in 1951, put it thus:
There is a sense in which rapid economic progress is impossible
without painful readjustments. Ancient philosophies have to be
scrapped; old social institutions have to disintegrate; bonds of cast,
creed and race have to be burst; and large numbers of persons who
cannot keep up with the progress have to have their expectations
of a comfortable life frustrated.
19 7
The meaning of the Market in development discourse
was therefore profoundly shaped by this realization of the
need to transform the traditional societies into modern,
rational, individual actors. For this project to be in line with
capitalism, it was justified in terms of the "the social.' 198
Just like the state played a significant role in managing the
"social" in industrialized societies, the Third World
governments could intervene to change the "conservatism"
193. The term is, of course, Karl Polanyi's. POLANYI, supra note 183.
194. See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal: The Third
World, Social Movements, and the Expansion of International Institutions, 41
HARv. INT'L L.J. 529, 549-55 (2000).
195. See Malenbaum, supra note 83, at 22-24.
196. M.A.G. VAN MEERHAEGHE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 153
(1966).
197. U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. AFFAIRS, MEASURES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF
UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 15 (1951).
198. See Rajagopal, supra note 194, at 549-55.
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of the peasants using the notion of the "social."199 Just like
the welfare state was an important instrument in
sustaining capitalism in the industrial societies, so was this
kind of intervention important in extending the Market in
the Third World. Put in terms of supporting the view of
development through state-led mobilization and allocation
of investment resources, the reasoning went thus:
Developing countries are characterized by accumulated cultural,
social and institutional rigidities, which inhibit or prevent change;
that resources tend to be 'stuck' (or, in economic terms, that the
supply of most goods and services in inelastic); and that only
determined government action to change the structures of
production, and trade and to reallocate resources within the
economy can bring about modernization and development.
200
The point that emerges here is that in the pre-1980
period the image of what constituted a Market economy in
the development discourse is a radically different one than
that of the post-1980 period in that same discourse. The
Market economy in the pre-1980 period was characterized
by laws intended to promote or regulate certain socio-
economic activities, by welfare legislation designed to
transfer certain incomes to certain households and firms. At
the same time, such an economy relied on laws to regulate
markets and, at times, prices in such a way as to influence
substantially the mobilization and allocation of resources.
At the same time, the state itself acted as a reservoir of
savings for reinvestment in certain critical sectors-either
as a response to a natural monopoly situation or where such
state production of goods and services is warranted by
social concerns. 201 George Powell, writing in 1961, stated
thus:
First, it is assumed that the governments of the underdeveloped
countries will have to, and will play an active role in the economy
both to initiate productive enterprises on its own, especially of the
social-overhead-capital nature, and to stimulate private enterprise
directly and indirectly by creating favorable climate in which
individual initiative can become much more effective than it has
199. See VAN MEERHAEGHE, supra note 196, at 153.
200. Warren Baum & Tolbert Stocks, Development Planning, in LAW




been in the past.2 02
This dominant view was also held by international
development agencies that financed most of the development"projects" in the developing countries whether by loans,
grants, or foreign aid. This included the World Bank.
Hence, an economic mission organized by the World Bank
with the task of formulating a general development
program for Colombia reported thus:
One cannot escape the conclusion that reliance on natural forces
has not produced the most happy results. Equally inescapable is
the conclusion that with knowledge of the underlying facts and
economic processes, good planning in setting objectives and
allocating resources, and determination in carrying out a program
for improvements and reforms, a great deal can be done to improve
the economic environment by shaping economic policies to meet
scientifically ascertained social requirements.
20 3
Similarly, Warren Baum and Tolbert Stocks, both
development economists at the World Bank, wrote as
follows:
But in much of the developing world in the 1940s and 1950s, the
neo-classical view seemed so remote from the realities of those
economies that it appeared irrelevant or even as a point of
departure for analysis. The wide acceptance of the structuralist
view was understandable. Most developing countries felt mired in
a condition of underdevelopment, and government activism
appeared to be the only available tool for achieving rapid economic
and social progress. Government, it was felt, must not only employ
various inducements and restrictions to control the private sector,
but must also take decisive steps to remove structural dis-
equilibria in the economy and bring about massive re-allocation of
resources. It should invest, promote, often act as an entrepreneur,
and through its own actions spur and guide development.
20 4
The position espoused by these two reports is no less
202. George Powell, Use of Commercial Policies for Purposes of Economic
Development with Respect to Selected Underdeveloped Countries (1961)
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Illinois) (on file with the Economics
Department, University of Illinois).
203. INT'L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEv., THE BASIS OF A
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR COLOMBIA 615 (1950).
204. Baum & Stocks, supra note 200, at 63.
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true today than it was in the 1960s. Yet, the meaning of the
Market has changed radically from what it was then.
Between 1950 and 1980, the Market principle in development
discourse was used to justify massive state interventions in
directing investment as a way of dealing with what were
understood as the rigidities and irrationality of the
traditional society. After 1980, this argument for state
intervention did not suddenly become less true. What
changed was the meaning of Market in the economic
development discourse. These types of arguments that
foregrounded the "social" simply faded from the discourse
as a result of the highlighting of different aspects of the
Market. The impact of this was to reorient the meaning of
the Market in the development discourse to a new set of
issues, ultimately rendering the different emphasis and
meaning of the Market as outlined above.
To reiterate this point, the aspects of the Market that
are emphasized in the development discourse today were
always present in the development discourse. These
elements are a central focus on the individual as a rational
actor and a preference for private-oriented bureaucratic
form for harnessing surplus for reinvestment. They
occupied a background stage between 1950 and 1980 while
the opposite aspects were foregrounded. The aspects that
were foregrounded in this earlier period were a focus on
state intervention and a preference for public-oriented
bureaucratic form for harnessing surplus for reinvestment.
In the post-1980 era, however, the discourses discussed
above concentrated their criticisms on these very aspects in
highlighting the costliness of state intervention. These
discourses latched on to the aspects of the Market discourse
that link rational human behavior with freedom and
liberty. This is the Hayekian idea that the free market is a
spontaneous order, and as such, is the natural outcome of a
long evolutionary process based on self-interested human
nature. 205  However, despite the cycling from one
understanding of the Market to the other, the bottom line is
that all countries must, and do, rely on a combination of
government intervention and Market forces to achieve
legitimate economic and non-economic objectives.
205. See generally 1 F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND




VI. THE DUALIST ELEMENTS IN THE MARKET DISCOURSE AND
THE SHIFT IN MEANING
In Part V, I suggested how a shift in the meaning of the
Market occurred as facilitated by a shift in the Market
discourse by foregrounding and backgrounding different
aspects of the role of the state in economic functioning. In
this Part, I want, very briefly, to suggest a theory for
understanding how this apparently radical shift in the
meaning occurred "smoothly" and without seeming to
disrupt the economic development discourse irreparably. I
had earlier in this Article suggested that both before and
after 1980, the construction of the Market was in polar
opposition to something else: first to "communism" and
central-planning and then to the state. 206 I pointed out that
both modes of dichotomies between the Market and the
state reveal contradictions. 207 However, I indicated that this
dualism that characterizes the understanding of the Market
in development discourse acts as the idealized starting
point in tailoring, and therefore constraining and limiting,
the set of policy instruments that are available.
The dualism of the Market as both a method of analysis
and a formula for prescribing economic policy positions at
the same time reflects, is parallel to, and connected with
the interventions against communism.208 This was the
importance of defining the "free world" distinguished by its
adherence to Market democracy as the opposite of"communism."209 This dualism worked as follows. During the
cold war, communism was represented as an all encompassing
"evil" force that had to be fought everywhere. 210 However
"[o]n the other hand, U.S. [intervention against communism]
was concentrated in practice in key areas, according to a
'strongpoint idea,' of (in George Kennan's words) 'adroit and
vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly
shifting geographical and political points.' ' 211
206. See supra Parts III, IV.
207. See supra Part III.
208. See ROBERT BIEL, THE NEW IMPERIALISM 63 (2000).
209. See supra Part III.




This dualist policy was analytically functional. The
broader concept that viewed communism as an all-
embracing "evil" allowed justifiable intervention anywhere
in the guise of the cold war, while the "concentrated"
intervention permitted attention to key strategic locations
over a prolonged period of time. 212 Since the capitalist
development and the "free world" were defined as opposites
of "communism," the two elements of the policy were
sufficient to justify various interventions in the Third
World. As such, it was unnecessary, at least at the
beginning, to invoke the Market as a political rhetoric
justifying intervention. In the entire speech of President
Truman, there was no invocation of the word 'Market. ' 213
Neither did the World Bank nor the IMF see themselves as
championing the "Market" course in their formative years.
They clearly saw themselves as advancing capitalist
development, and perhaps free markets-but only as
contra-distinguished to communism and central planning.
It is important to emphasize that what the IFIs opposed
in the pre-1980 period was "central planning"-defined as
synonymous with communism. Yet communism was defined
not in terms of its relation to intervention in the Market,
but in terms of other pernicious political tendencies
"[s]ubject[ing] the individual to arrest without lawful cause,
punishment without trial, and forced labor as the chattel of
the state ... decree[ing] what information he shall receive,
what art he shall produce, what leaders he shall follow, and
what thoughts he shall think. ' 214
The point is, at this time, what was considered the
defining characteristic of communism was not state
intervention in the economy-but other alleged political
manifestations of communism: arbitrary arrests of
dissenters; cruel and inhuman punishment; lack of freedom
of speech, assembly and thought.21 5 Communism was not
"bad" because the governments that practiced it intervened
in the "Market"; communism was bad because it bred
unacceptable political control by the state. Indeed,
Keynesian consensus was based on a socially-oriented,
212. See id.
213. See TRUMAN, supra note 60.




interventionist, and benevolent state.216 Such a state
engages policies aimed at stimulating demand and ensuring
full employment by intervening in the Market. 217 However,
by defining communism in terms of its political correlates,
and not by its relation to the Market, this discourse masked
the fact that the difference between the "free world" of
"Market societies" and the "unfree world" of "central-
planning societies" was not one of nature, but degree of
planning. For example, Arthur Lewis, a prominent
development economist, wrote in 1955:
[T]he case against detailed central planning is that it is
undemocratic, bureaucratic, inflexible, and subject to great error
and confusion. It is also unnecessary. There is a much better case
for piece-meal planning; that is to say, for concentrating on a few
matters which it is particularly desired to influence, such as the
level of exports, or of capital formation, or of industrial production,
or of food production .... Some planning is necessary, since the
results of demand and supply are not socially acceptable in their
entirety .... 218
Therefore, in the early years of developing economics,
projects were not conceived in terms of ceding more powers
to the Market actors as opposed to the state. Though
communism was explicitly identified with "central
planning," the goal of ceding the "fundamental economic
role" to Market actors was not an articulated goal of legal or
economic reforms in the context of development. In fact the
language of "reducing" the role of the state in the economy
did not appear in World Bank literature until after 1980.219
216. See Mark Kelman, Could Lawyers Stop Recessions? Speculations on
Law and Macroeconomics, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1215, 1235-37 (1993) (arguing that
the Keynesians consensus was that it was appropriate for the government to
actively intervene in the economy even though there was disagreement about
the appropriate instruments for such intervention); see also Maxwell 0.
Chibundu, Law and the Political Economy of Privatization in Sub-Saharan
Africa, 21 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1, 17-24 (1997) (arguing that most African
countries adopted Keynesian "liberal internationalism" after independence).
217. Economists disagreed on the legitimate goals for government
intervention-whether to reduce inflation or achieve full employment-as well
as the policy instruments for such intervention-whether fiscal or monetary.
See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 216.
218. W. ARTHUR LEWIS, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIc GROWTH 384 (1955).
219. See Ngugi, supra note 133, at 523-33 (tracing the "Rule of Law" and
"Good Governance" projects in developing countries in the context of Market-
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The reason was that such rhetoric was simply unnecessary
if counter-productive to the interventions in the pre-1980
period. The typical development project in the 1950s, 1960s,
and 1970s was a public project: the state reorienting
economic priorities. 220 The Market rhetoric was made
unnecessary by the fact that the dualist elements in the
war against communism could also be marshaled to justify
and legitimate specific interventions.
The dualistic elements in the Market discourse neatly
facilitated the radical shifts in the meaning of the Market
in development discourse. Intervention on grounds of
capitalist development based on relatively coherent, self-
reproducing dynamics could be legitimated in the 1960s and
1970s as being "capitalist" and therefore "free" and
"democratic" as opposed to "totalitarian" and "communist. ' 221
Of course the overarching anti-Communist vision meant
that any intervention could be justified as being anti-
Communist since communism was defined as all-
embracing. However, development theory that legitimated
this self-reproducing dynamic that capitalist development
both promised and invoked as reason for intervention was
premised on three key elements each of which had to be
refuted or modified in the 1980s during the launching of the
neo-liberal economic reforms. These were (i) Stages Theory;
(ii) The Rural-Urban Dualism; and (iii) Import Substitution
Industrialization (ISI). I will discuss each of these briefly
below.
A. The Stages Theory and the Linked Concept of Trickle-
Down222
The stages theory and the associated concept of trickle-
down effect were mainly propagated by the American
economic historian Walt Rostow. 223 The theory is based on
nineteenth century theories of evolution. It stipulates "that
development proceeds through a linear succession of stages
oriented legal reforms, and tracing the origins of the imagery of reducing the
economic role of the state in economic functioning as the chief mantra of the
development discourse after 1980).
220. See Salacuse, supra note 10, at 877-78.
221. See BIEL, supra note 208, at 73.
222. Id. at 74.
223. W.W. ROSTOW, THE STATES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (2d ed. 1971).
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copied from the historical experience of existing industrial
countries. '224 According to this theory, development could
be sub-divided into five distinct time segments each
characterized by different sources and patterns of economic
changes. 225 According to Rostow, the five distinct stages of
economic growth are: the traditional society, the preconditions
for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age
of high mass consumption. 226 Rostow wrote that while the
developing countries were in the first two stages of
unidirectional growth, it was possible to deliberately
accelerate the "take off stage."227 Rostow defined the "take-
off' period as the period when self-sustaining growth can be
achieved because the degree of "productive economic
activity reaches a critical level and produces changes which
lead to a massive and progressive structural transformation
[of the] econom[y] and the societ[y].."228 According to Rostow,
the take-off stage can only be reached if three important
preconditions are met. First, there has to be an increase in
the rate of saving from five percent to ten percent of the
national income (i.e., capital accumulation). 229 Second,
there has to be productive investment of surplus savings in
new industries (i.e. development of at least one substantial
industrial sector).230 Third, the development of a political,
social, and institutional framework that is capable of
exploiting the impulses to expand in the modern sector.231
According to Rostow's theory, it was especially
important to reach the take-off stage because growth was a
discontinuous and dialectical process until the take-off
stage of self-sustained advancement was reached.232 To
reach the take-off stage, developing countries had to make
strategic decisions affecting resource allocation designed to
224. BIEL, supra note 208, at 74.
225. See ROSTOW, supra note 223, at 4-16.
226. Id. at 4-11.
227. Id. at 39-40.
228. Id. at 40.
229. Id. at 39.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. Id. at 40.
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stimulate investment in leading sectors.233 The bottom line
was that "[l]arge growth-rates, which are seen as
qualitatively different from small ones, are required for
take-off. ' 23 4 To achieve these large growth-rates, very big
increases in savings were needed. These savings could only
be made by withdrawing resources from consumption, and
concentrating them in the hands of entrepreneurs. To this
extent, therefore, Rostow relied on state intervention to
help the entrepreneurial class to accumulate sufficient
surplus for reinvestment in the take-off stage.
B. The Rural -Urban Dualism Model
The Rural-Urban dualism model is also known as the
Lewis "two sector model" or "the surplus labor model.."235
Arthur Lewis was the most influential propagator of this
dualistic theory of economic development. 236 Lewis's model
is built on "the empirical fact that developing countries are
labour-surplus economies, especially in the large agricultural
sectors dominated by low-productivity traditional farming
which relies on unpaid family labour for subsistence
production. ' 237 According to Lewis, the typical under-
developed economy consists of two sectors: the traditional,
overpopulated, rural subsistence sector, and a modern,
urban industrial sector. 238
Lewis argued that that traditional sector was
characterized by "surplus" labor because the marginal
productivity of labor in this sector was zero. 239 This meant
that this "surplus" labor could be withdrawn from this
233. See id. at 39-40 (discussing the importance of developing substantial
manufacturing sectors to reaching the take-off stage).
234. BIEL, supra note 208, at 75.
235. See generally LEWIS, supra note 218; see also BIEL, supra note 208, at
75; MEHMET, supra note 71, at 71-76.
236. For examples of Lewis's work, see LEWIS, supra note 218; W. Arthur
Lewis, Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour, in THE
ECONOMICS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT 400 (A. N. Aggarwala & S. P. Singh eds.,
1958). Lewis's model had a great intellectual impact, and eventually won him a
Nobel Prize in Economics.
237. MEHMET, supra note 71, at 72.
238. LEWIS, supra note 218.
239. Lewis, supra note 236, at 402-03.
[Vol. 56
FORGETTING LOCHNER
sector without any loss in productivity. 240 On the other
hand, the industrial sector was characterized by high
productivity. 241 For economic development to occur, Lewis
argued, there had to be structural change in the economy
whereby the surplus labor in the traditional agricultural
sector with zero marginal labor productivity is withdrawn
and directed to the modern industrial sector.242 The focus of
the model, therefore, was the simultaneous transfer of labor
from the traditional sector, and the development of output
and employment opportunities in the industrial sector
where this labor would be absorbed.
243
In accordance with this theory, Lewis suggested that
the government should craft policies that would enable the
entrepreneurial class to tap into this pool of surplus labor.
The capital available at one time would be reinvested into
productive activity that would attract labor from the rural
sectors. If they are paid just sufficiently to make it
attractive for them to migrate while reinvesting the rest in
productive activity again in the next cycle, this would
continue until the surplus labor has been absorbed
completely. By this time, the economy would have been
transformed as well. Hence, the basic idea in this model is
two-fold: first, to make use of the surplus labor; and,
second, to remove resources from the non-capitalist classes
and to concentrate them on the capitalist industrialists who
are profit maximizers. The underlying assumption, like in
Rostow's model, is that the entrepreneurial class would
reinvest the surplus. However, if an economy concentrates
resources on non-capitalist classes such as the working
classes or the political elite, they will consume rather than
save for reinvestment.
C. Import Substituting Industrialization (ISI)
Import Substituting Industrialization (ISI) was first
inspired by the findings of Raul Prebisch and Hans
Singer.244 Prebisch and Singer used trade data to show
240. Id.
241. See id. at 407-08.
242. Id. at 412.
243. See id.
244. Prebisch's theoretical formulations were mainly contained in U.N.
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that, contrary to neo-classical trade theories, international
trade could not act as an engine of growth for developing
countries. 245 This was because the terms of trade in
international trade are biased against primary producers,
and that these terms had been deteriorating for these
producers. The argument was that international trade did
not diffuse gains of trade to all trading countries as neo-
classical theories claimed. Trade had actually impoverished
primary producers. 246
DEP'T OF ECON. AFFAIRS, ECON. COMM'N. FOR LATIN AMERICA, THE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND ITS PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.12/89/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 1950.II.G.2 (1950); U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. &
Soc. AFFAIRS, ECONOMIC SURVEY OF LATIN AMERICA 1956, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.12/427/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 1957.II.G.1 (1957); see also Hans Singer,
The Distribution of Gains Between Investing and Borrowing Countries, 40 AM.
ECON. REV. 473 (1950).
245. See ECONOMIC SURVEY OF LATIN AMERICA, supra note 244; THE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND ITS PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS, supra
note 244; Singer, supra note 244.
246. Dependency Theorists started with the Prebisch-Singer thesis to
advance the argument that no autonomous economic development could occur
within the developing countries unless these countries de-linked from their
dependence on the capital, technology, and markets of the developed countries.
Historically, the Dependency Theorists argued that the relationship between
metropolises (advanced economic centers) and peripheries (backward and
underdeveloped centers) is a reflection of mercantilist and capitalist expansion
since the sixteenth century. They therefore argued that underdevelopment was
a negative impact of capitalism and the unequal exchange that it has
constructed in international trade. Unequal international exchange is a result
of distortions in export activities. Integration into the world capitalist market
only makes the developing countries unable to challenge the dominance of the
metropolises. This is because the kind of capitalism practiced in the developing
countries is a "dependent" one: one integrated into the needs of the
Metropolitan powers, and preserved their competitive dominance. It therefore
functions to stunt and constrain rather than generate development in the
developing countries. The extractive and manufacturing industries that
dominate the industrial horizon of developing countries are run in strictly
functional terms that generate surpluses that are realized within the
metropolitan economies. In order to develop, therefore, the dependency school
argued that the developing countries must seek to do so autonomously. For good
exposition of the dependency theories, see SAMIR AMIN, ACCUMULATION ON A
WORLD SCALE: A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT (1974); SAMIR
AMIN, UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT: AN ESSAY ON THE SOCIAL FORMATIONS OF
PERIPHERAL CAPITALISM (1976); ARGHIRI EMMANUEL, UNEQUAL EXCHANGE: A
STUDY OF THE IMPERIALISM OF TRADE (Brian Pearce trans., Monthly Review
Press 1972) (1969); ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, CAPITALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT
IN LATIN AMERICA (1967); 1 IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN WORLD
SYSTEM (1974); 2 IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN WORLD SYSTEM (1980);
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Dependent Capitalist Development in Latin
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The development strategy to emerge from this thesis
was that capitalist national development could eventually
be brought about by import substitution-placing limitations
on imports and establishing an industrial base for the
assembly or manufacture of corresponding goods within the
nation.247 Such a strategy would both encourage domestic
industrialization and stem the tide of declining terms of
trade. Hence, ISI involved the creation of enclave
manufacturing sectors by active government intervention
that included the creation of a regime tailored to transfer
resources from the rural sectors to the infant industrializing
sector through taxation, over-valued currency, and exchange
controls.
All three dominant economic development theories (i.e.,
Rostow's "Stages Theory," Lewis's "Two Sector Model," and
Prebisch-Singer's ISI) were notable in their anti-rural and
pro-capital characteristics coupled with a strong
interventionist stance. However, what distinguished all of
them as "Market-oriented" was the fact that they could
somewhat be constructed as being against communism or
"that false philosophy."248  Since all the theories
contemplated by the state orienting the economy in a way
that ensured the accumulation of an economic surplus that
could then be used in a specific way, they were decidedly
against mass or grass-root organization that would have
challenged the channeling of the economic surplus in any
way other than the one preferred by the government. These
theories envisaged a system where legal institutions, formal
laws, and government policies would rearrange and
redistribute assets and resources in such a way that the
surplus will end up in the hands of the entrepreneurial
class.
249
America, 74 NEW LEFT REV. 83 (1972); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Rise and
Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative
Analysis, 16 COMP. STUD. IN Soc'Y & HIST. 387 (1974).
247. BIEL, supra note 208, at 79-86; MEHMET, supra note 71, at 76-80.
248. TRUMAN, supra note 60, at 8.
249. Among the most forceful criticisms of these theories are those that
point out the underlying assumption that distribution of resources only occurs
at the surplus stage. These criticisms point out that distribution occurs at every
stage in the production cycle. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-
Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal Studies, in 2 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 465 (Peter Newman ed.,
1998). Other critiques have questioned the assumption that there can be an
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On the other hand, alternate policies that were objected
to by mainstream development theorists as "communist' or
"Marxist" were not any different in their application of neo-
classical analysis. For example, Samir Amin and Immanuel
Wallerstein, the foremost dependency theorists, almost
invariably rely on neo-classical tools coupled with a strong
set of policy instruments in trade policy that discourages
importation while advantaging self-sufficiency. 250 Yet their
theories are considered Marxist. However, it turns out that
what made them "Communist" or "Marxist" is not the fact
of intervention by the state or policy-driven use of
capitalism or investment, since the liberal, 'Market-oriented"
policies did that as well. What made them different was
only their self-identification as pro-Marxist or anti-
Capitalist, and their call for de-linking with the industrial
capitalist markets of the North and not their reliance on a
set of policy tools any qualitatively different from that
relied on by the mainstream theories summarized above.
In the 1980s, as a result of the change in the discourse,
which was a consequence of the events described and
analyzed in Part III of this Article, the main elements in
economic surplus that is utilized in a specific way. They point out that when
certain sectors in an economy accumulate a surplus, in truth what is happening
is the transformation of human interactions in a destructive way through
hatred, competition, etc. What is termed the "surplus" is really what is taxed on
the traditional society by breaking up the traditional system, and extracting
from the solidarities of the rural families. See Harry W. Pearson, The Economy
Has No Surplus, in TRADE AND MARKET IN THE EARLY EMPIRES 320 (Karl Polanyi
et al. eds., 1957) (expressing the view that "surplus," like "scarcity" is a socially
instituted phenomenon not a natural one). Feminist economists also point out
that these theories do not value some kinds of work, especially reproductive
work, that is done by females. Feminist economists criticize the omission of the
reproductive sphere in conventional macro-economics. They also draw attention
to the interdependencies between the unpaid and the paid economy and
women's social positioning as intermediaries between the two spheres. Aside
from the problem of under- or non-valuation of reproductive work, feminist
critical economists also point to the gendered nature of markets. In such
markets, the asymmetrical gender situation is likely to generate a surplus in
the economy that is based on disadvantaging women. See, e.g., FEMINIST
APPROACHES TO DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS (Diane Elson ed., 1996); Diane Elson,
People, Development and International Financial Institutions: An Interpretation
of the Bretton Woods System, 62 REV. AFRICAN POL. ECON. 511 (1994); see also
Kerry Rittich, Recharacterizing Restructuring: Gender and Distribution in the
Legal Structures of Market Reform (1998) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation,
Harvard Law School) (on file with Harvard Law Library).
250. See supra note 246 and accompanying text (discussing further Amin
and Wallerstein's dependency theories).
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the three theories of development discussed above had to be
refuted. Most importantly, the idea that the state needed to
explicitly organize the accumulation of surplus and
productive investment through the use of law was targeted
in the economic development discourse. The new meaning
of the Market in the discourse emphasized the idea that
Markets and the attendant accumulation that follows
capitalist development is the product, not of explicit
planning by the state, but of a spontaneous natural order
resulting from the market.251
The idea of the Market as the rhetoric and metaphor
that hosted the campaign for the refutation of these
elements is doubly significant. First, the idea resonated
generally with historical roots of capitalist development
from the time of the abolition of the Corn Laws and
Cobden's "Free market" in England.252 The return of the
Market in the 1980s could therefore be justified as either a
return to normalcy or a correction of earlier distortions of
the Market through state intervention. 253 Second, and
significantly, however, the Market also forms a telling
parallel in terms of functional utility of its idea as a
construct with anti-Communist intervention. This enabled
the radical shift from supporting some of the elements in
these three pro-capitalist, anti-rural theories to refuting
them completely without causing a rupture in the economic
development discourse. The dualistic component of the
Market could neatly take over the dualistic component of
anti-Communist intervention because it has an exact
similar component itself that can functionally be
operationalized to both form an overarching vision while
251. See 3 F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL
ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE (1979),
252. See generally Albert 0. Hirshman, How the Keynesian Revolution Was
Exported from the United States, and Other Comments, in THE POLITICAL POWER
OF ECONOMIC IDEAS: KEYNESIANISM ACROSS NATIONS 347, 347-59 (Peter A. Hall
ed., 1989) (noting that Free Trade won its first major domestic victory in
England with the abolition of the Corn Laws in 1846. Afterwards, the doctrine
acquired considerable hegemony worldwide and was buttressed by the Cobden-
Chevalier Treaty of 1860).
253. See, e.g., DEEPAK LAL, THE POVERTY OF 'DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS'
(2000) (arguing that the theories of development that began by suggesting that
the typical Third World country was structurally different than a developed
country (like the three theories discussed above) were based on "dirigiste
dogma" rather than rigorous economics).
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prescribing specific programmatic actions.
So the Market concept is dualist in the two senses
already mentioned earlier. First, through the assumptions
that make up its idealized version, it is seen through the
axis of rational-irrational. The Market is constructed upon
axioms of individualism and utility maximization that are
projected as rational. At the same time, other modes of
behavior-derived from sharing and co-operation, for
example-are deemed irrational or non-rational. The
second dualism is that the Market, as it emerges from the
economic development discourse in the post-1980 period, is
both a method of analysis and a formula for prescribing
policy positions at the same time. The Market is neither
just an analytical mode that is used to evaluate economies
along particular structural or institutional correlates. Nor
does it just prescribe a set of policy interventions that must
be implemented. Instead, by emphasizing one aspect of the
dualism of the Market over the other, it becomes possible to
reorient the debate or discourse that shapes or frames the
meaning of the Market in a given direction. Similarly, since
the boundaries in the dichotomies/dualisms are porous and
plastic, it becomes possible to "hang" together very different
principles/ideas without making them seem inconsistent
with each other.
In the pre-1980 period, state intervention in the Market
was justified using the first dualist dichotomy in the
schema. As we showed in Part III, it was argued that given
the cultural rigidities that existed in most developing
countries, the rational thing to do was for the state to
intervene in the Market. 25 4 This argument could support all
three dominant theories as I described them above: stages
of growth theory, excess labor theory, and import
substitution industrialization. 255 In the post-1980 period,
when the shift in the meaning of the Market that I have
been describing occurred, it was not so much because new
knowledge or a shift in the discourse that showed it was
irrational to intervene in the markets. Rather, it was the
fact that the shift in the discourse elaborated a new
criterion for markets that shifted the focus from the
structural issues highlighted by the paradigm, to what a
254. See supra Part III.
255. See supra notes 223-48 and accompanying text.
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real Market model should be. This meant defining the
Market, and "Market-oriented" reforms, using a completely
new schema: the second set of dualism. Hence, by shifting
focus from the first set of dualism to the new one, the
framing of the meaning of the Market radically changed.
To conclude this Part, consider the following quote by
Irving Friedman, the Economic Advisor to the President of
the World Bank:
This demand for certainty requires answers to difficult questions.
Many of these questions-free v. protected markets; non-
discrimination v. discrimination; private v. government control of
industry, to name only a few-are not new .... At the same time,
the traditional answers are being challenged all over the world,
probably the majority of those attending this discussion would
agree with the belief that organized trade is preferable to free
trade under the present circumstances.
2 56
This quote is from a speech given in 1965. It illustrates
that all the elements of the Market touched upon above
were always present in the discourse but the meaning of
the Market that prevailed in the pre-1980 period depended
on what issues were foregrounded and highlighted.
VII. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE SHIFT IN MEANING OF
THE MARKET IN THE POST-1980 PERIOD
In this Part, I will analyze and critique the new
meaning of the Market that emerged in the 1980s. As in the
previous Parts, the aim is two-fold. First, I hope to reveal
the underlying contradictions in the mode of the Market
that is now in vogue as defined by an emphasis on the self-
interested individual as an independent economic actor only
relating to others through primarily the medium of the
unregulated Market. Second, I will aim to demonstrate how
and why the "new" meaning of the Market shares similar
characteristics with the "old" meaning except that each
highlights different aspects of the same general concept. I
will do this in a series of general critiques aimed at
analyzing the shift in the meaning of the Market in the
post-1980 period.
256. Irving Friedman, Foreword in LAW MAKING AND DEVELOPMENT, supra
note 200, at 27.
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It will emerge from the list below that some, if not all,
of the critiques I raise have been known in the discourse for
a while. Most of these critiques occupied a contested but
fore-grounded arena in the development discourse in the
pre-1980 period. However, with the shifts in the discourse
in the post-1980 period, these critiques were taken for
granted-they were pushed into the background
uncontested arena. The difference in this positioning of the
doubts about the clarity of the laws of the Market, the
extent to which one could extrapolate their consequences,
and so forth has profound effects on our perceptions of what
the Market means. The presence of these doubts or
critiques in the contested foreground arena in the pre-1980
period disabled the highlighting of the "individual/private"
axis of the meaning of the Market in the economic
development discourse and dampened the effects of the
overestimation of economics to predict the behavior of
rational human beings as private actors. However, with the
shift in the meaning of the Market in the post-1980 period,
most of these critiques were slowly pushed into the
background contested or uncontested arena.257 With the
change in situating these doubts/critiques, the approach to
the meaning and role of markets in the economy that is in
vogue ends up vastly overestimating the rationality of the
human being as a utility-maximizing economic actor. It also
exaggerates the role of legal categories, and the
determinacy of the legal-economic nexus that goes with it.
A. The Market is Enabled by the State and cannot be
Defined in its Absence
Despite the claims of the new Market discourse that
emerged after 1980, the Market is not only "the supreme
medium for the expression of individual choice";258 it is also
a social construction of particular legal rules, ideology, and
social arrangements. 259 The Market is not just the perfectly
competitive, "atomistic realm of impersonal economic
257. See supra Part IV.
258. GEOFFREY HODGSON, ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS: A MANIFESTO FOR A
MODERN INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 178 (1988).
259. See Gary Minda, Globalization, Decline of the Nation-State, and
Foucault, in THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT
AND PROPERTY 151, 159 (Nicholas Mercuro & Warren J. Samuels eds., 1999).
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exchange of homogenous goods by means of voluntary
transactions on an equal basis between large numbers of
autonomous, fully informed entities with profit-maximizing
behavioral motivations, and able to enter and leave
freely";260 it is also a social institution that structures,
organizes, and legitimates contractual agreements and the
exchange of property rights in the society. 261
As such, the self-regulating Market is created by the
state.262 It, therefore, is not instituted by the absence of
regulations, but by the presence of certain regulations. As
Bernard Edelman would argue, it is the state through legal
institutions that "puts the marks of property, freedom, and
equality on the face of exchange value"-whereas in the
relations of production these could easily be read as
"exploitation, slavery, inequality, and sacred egoism. 26 3
However, in persuading developing countries to reform
and pursue capitalism and the Market system, it has been
customary to extol the advantages of the Market as opposed
to the government. 26 4 Most proponents of Market-oriented
reforms also create the myth of the self-adjusting Market.
260. Barbara Harriss-White, Maps and Landscapes of Grain Markets in
South Asia, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND THIRD WORLD
DEVELOPMENT 87, 87 (John Harriss et al. eds., 1995).
261. HODGSON, supra note 258, at 174.
262. See generally POLANYI, supra note 183; KARL POLANYi, THE LIVELIHOOD
OF MAN (Harry W. Pearson ed., 1977). I see my study as aimed at showing how
a selective construct of the "Market" is used to prescribe to the Third World
states a version of the Market that, at least in rhetoric, verges on creation of the
self-regulating Market as part of the neo-liberal Market-oriented reforms. The
process of creating such a Market involves mischaracterizing the Market as it
exists in the industrial North, as well as misdescribing the processes through
which such a Market is to be established. However, the view that the self-
regulating Market is created by the state which I adopt, is seriously challenged
by the rival view of the Austrian school, that the free Market is a spontaneous,
natural outcome of an evolutionary process based on human rationality and
self-interest. For this latter view, see THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, supra note 146, at
17. See generally RICHARD MCKENZIE, COMPETING VISIONS: THE POLITICAL
CONFLICT OVER AMERICA'S ECONOMIC FUTURE (1985); LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN
ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS (1949); Friedrich A. Hayek, Reflections on
Constitutional Economics, in CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: CONTAINING THE
ECONOMIC POWERS OF GOVERNMENT 235 (Richard McKenzie ed., 1984).
263. BERNARD EDELMAN, OWNERSHIP OF THE IMAGE: ELEMENTS FOR A MARXIST
THEORY OF LAW 94 (Elizabeth Kingdom trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979)
(1973).
264. See generally WORLD BANK, FROM PLAN TO MARKET, supra note 17.
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However, the contradiction in all these is rather apparent.
It stems from the fact that a self-adjusting Market system
is not a natural consequence, but is dependent on certain
stimulants. 265 The first imposition that the self-adjusting
Market demands is the institutional separation of society
into an economic and political sphere. 266 It rests on the
ability to remove all non-economic institutional regulations
from the organization of buying and selling and vice-
versa.267 Yet, neo-liberalism reforms are foisted on the need
to reduce the fundamental role of the state in economic
organization. 268 The irony is that it would take the coercive
power of the state to both institutionalize the regulations
and stimulants required to create the Market as well as the
ideology supporting it.269 The state therefore is important
and plays a significant role both in supplying the formal
institutions allowing a shift to the Market economy, and the
background rules which also play a causal role in constraining
the particular mode of Market that is created.270 States are
expected to supply these background rules supporting the
transition to a Market economy.271 The particular kind of
Market economy that is created is dependent on the kind of
background norms that the state supplies, as well as the
particular kind of formal, foreground norms that the state
enacts. However the "Market-oriented" reforms that are
265. See POLANYI, supra note 183, at 56.
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note
36, at 9. The World Bank writes:
The approach to development that seems to have worked most reliably,
and which seems to offer most promise, suggests a reappraisal of the
respective roles for the market and the state. Put simply, governments
need to do less in those areas where markets work, or can be made to
work ....
Id.
269. See POLANYI, supra note 183, at 56, 250.
270. DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 248 (1996) (recognizing
the causal role of background rules in constraining outcomes).
271. See Warren J. Samuels, Interrelations Between Legal and Economic
Processes, 14 J.L. & ECON. 435, 450 (1971) ("The economy must be seen as an
object of legal control and the law as a means of seeking private economic gain
or advantage. Legal impact upon the private economic sphere and the economic
use of government have not been the exception; rather they have been the
fundamental and regular, perhaps daily pattern.").
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suggested in the post-1980 period ignore this background
role of the state, and imagine that a Market can be defined
in the absence of the state.
B. The Post-1980 Model of the Market Imagines that the
Economic Actors are Pre-Political Agents
The Market and the economic actors acting in it are not
pre-political agents. Rather, they are products of state
intervention in economic policy up until the present.272 As
such, whether the state acts or fails to act in a given sphere,
it either maintains or modifies the utilization of resources
available to society. This is a political decision that affects
different actors differently. The assumption that the state
can only enact neutral laws to facilitate economic actors to
deal with each other in the market is an illusion. As Neva
Makgetla and Robert Seidman stated this point:
Neither economic policy nor law can be neutral. The state uses its
power, translated into new legal measures to solve social
problems. But social problems affect different groups and strata
differentially. Every exercise of state power inevitably favors one
or the other of them. In economic terms, given scarcity, any
allocation of resources will benefit some people, harm others. In
enacting laws to implement economic policy, the state effectively
reacts to the demands of a particular group.
27 3
C. The Post-1980 Image of the Market Conceives Legal
Categories as Simple and Unproblematic
In the post-1980 model of the Market, legal and
technocratic institutions are constructed as neutral. 274
Legal rules about allocation of economic resources in the
society are deemed to be merely technical and pragmatic
devices that neutrally structure the relationship between
the state and the Market, and between the different
economic actors in the Market.275 However, it turns out that
272. See POLANYI, supra note 183, at 56; see also supra note 52.
273. Neva Makgetla & Robert Seidman, Ownership of Capital and Its
Implications for Development in a Liberated South Africa, in LAW MAKING AND
DEVELOPMENT (Seymour Haregot ed., 1987).




the institutions are not neutral at all. As legal realists long
demonstrated, even when legal categories seem neutral,
they can often affect the various economic actors
differentially. 276 This is because often, the rules and
institutions are themselves ambiguous and capable of more
than one plausible interpretation. "Clear contract and
property rights,"277 for example, could mean an awful lot of
things. As Duncan Kennedy explains:
The legal realists have taught us that 'property' is an
extraordinarily vague term. The concept itself gives no clue as to
what kinds of things can be 'objects' of ownership, nor as to the
particular rights, powers, privileges, and immunities that go along
with ownership. 'Property' is a catch all for an infinitely varied set
of 'bundles of rights.' What can be done in one of those bundles is a
legal decision. Such a decision can be intelligibly justified only by
reference to the legislative policy of the community. 'Contract' is
no more clear-cut. The enforcement of a contract against the will of
one of the parties is, like any other lawsuit, an instance of
unfreedom or coercion. The exact kind and extent of state coercion
that should occur in connection with private agreements cannot be
deduced from the idea of the contract itself.278
In other words, the "neutral" and pragmatic institutions
that this model of the Market prescribes can, in reality, be
made concrete in many different ways. 279 The way we
answer some foundational questions about the content of
the legal institutions undergirding the Market model
determines the nature of property and contract rights that
one realizes in the end. Some of the foundational questions
include what exact bundle of rights an owner gets, whether
that bundle can or should be permanently redistributed, in
what ways the interests can be transferred, and what
counts as a "voluntary" transfer as opposed to a "coerced"
276. See generally Kennedy, supra note 18.
277. The World Bank characteristically prescribes the establishment of
"clear contract and property rights" as a sine qua non to development. See, e.g.,
WORLD BANK, FROM PLAN TO MARKET, supra note 17.
278. Kennedy, supra note 18, at 951.
279. See, e.g., Michael Robertson, Reconceiving Private Property, 24 J.L. &
Soc. 465 (1997). Professor Robertson demonstrates that it is possible to





Alternatively, freedom of contract, property, and other
legal institutions are institutionally and culturally
embedded. 28' Therefore, it is difficult, nay, impossible to
determine the economic impacts of legal institutions unless
one is "ideological" about their meaning in the sense of
choosing a given interpretation and "naturalizing" it.282 An
additional difficulty with the model's characterization of the
law and legal institutions is that law is a complex and often
contradictory instrument, not simple and unproblematic.
28 3
As such, there is no single model of a legal system that
would render a Market-friendly system. Therefore, the
suggestion that all one needs to take into account to usher
in a Market system is to consider the five "attributes of
market-friendly legal systems" is deceptive. 28 4 The five
"attributes" are named as rules known in advance; rules
actually in force; availability of mechanisms for the
application of the rules; independent bodies to resolve
conflicts over the interpretation of rules; and, procedures
280. See, e.g., Michael Robertson, Property and Ideology, 8 CAN. J.L. JURIS.
275 (1995).
281. See, e.g., KATHARINA PISTOR & PHILLIP A. WELLONS, THE ROLE OF LAW
AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 1960-1985 (1998).
282. I use the term "ideological" here to mean the more ordinary, value-
neutral sense of a system of political ideas. Stuart Hall defines an ideology as a
"system of representation .... Ideologies are the frameworks of thinking and
calculation about the world-the "ideas" which people use to figure out how the
social world works, what their place is in it, and what they ought to do." Stuart
Hall, Signification, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the Post-
Structuralist Debates, 2 CRITICAL MASS COMM. 91, 97 (1985). See generally Joel
Ngugi, Re-Examining the Role of Private Property in Market Democracies:
Problematic Ideological Issues Raised by Land Registration, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L.
467, 512-13 (2004) (demonstrating that even "technical" categories such as land
registration do not have fixed meanings but are contingent on the context and
the degree to which economic actors organize, invent, and mobilize competing
norms to frustrate the complete operation of the formal institutions).
283. See Julio Faundez, Legal Reform in Developing and Transition
Countries: Making Haste Slowly, in COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL AND JUDICIAL
DEVELOPMENT: TOWARD AN AGENDA FOR A JUST AND EQUITABLE SOCIETY IN THE
21ST CENTURY 369, 369 (Rudolf V. Van Puymbroeck ed., 2001).
284. See Robert D. Cooter, The Rule of State Law and the Rule-of-Law State:
Economic Analysis of the Legal Foundations of Development, in WORLD BANK,
ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1996, at 191
(Michael Bruno & Boris Pleskovic eds., 1997).
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for amending the.28 5
At the same time, the kind of foreground and
background norms that the state supplies are mediated and
negotiated by informal norms supplied by other economic
actors.28 6 The upshot is that, unless every state supplies
some exactly specified foreground and background norms,
the resultant Market society would differ from state to
state. Since there is no agreed content or benchmarks on
what the "Market" does or does not consist of, each state
would likely have its own brand of the Market. This, in
turn, means that it is not possible to aggregate what a
"Market" society means and then prescribe that formula to
transition economies.
Additionally, this post-1980 reliance on categories of
the law that it treats as unproblematic creates another
conceptual difficulty. Since legal categories and institutions
are deemed to be neutral and objective, they therefore
define the endowment set as indefeasible. However, it turns
out, as demonstrated above, that neither property nor
contract is a natural given. So it turns out that this
conception of the market suspends inquiry into the role of
the state at the point at which contract and property are
defined. Asking the prior question, however, reopens the
whole issue of how we should define property and contract.
Asking these prior questions ineluctably destabilizes the
conception that property and contract are secure and stable.
Besides, even assuming a general agreement on the
definition of property and rules of contract, this conception
of the Market ignores the fact that both in adjudication and
in social operationalization, property and rules of contract
are constantly redefined. 28 7 If this is true, then it seriously
challenges the notion of the fixed indefeasible endowment.
285. See id.
286. See, e.g., Ngugi, supra note 282 (demonstrating that, at times, economic
actors organize, invent, and mobilize competing norms to frustrate the complete
operation of the formal institutions).
287. See Kennedy, supra note 18, at 951-52; Robert Gordon, The Elusive
Transformation, 6 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 137, 141 (1994). See also chapter three
of Joel Ngugi, Searching for the Market Criterion (2002) (S.J.D. dissertation,
Harvard Law School) (on file with author), for a case study of Kenya land




D. The Post-1980 Model Assumes that the "Market" as a
Concept Has an Agreed Content
The argument here is that, in the guise of enunciating
the new global "Market consensus," a political agenda is
enacted "for managing, maintaining and coordinating the
functions of governments and their national interests at the
international level. ' 288 In this agenda, economics, through a
highly idiosyncratic list of what "Market consensus" entails,
becomes an instrument for attainment of politically chosen
goals-but by displacing politics not by recognizing that it
(economics) is the "indispensable servant of the sociopolitical
order to which it ministers. ' 289 It displaces politics by
comprehending the "Market consensus," a significantly
social and political phenomenon, in strictly economic terms
that only calls for political governance through legal
innovation.
As I argue elsewhere, this "displacement" of politics is
both contradictory and dangerous. 290 It is dangerous
because, on analysis, it turns out that politics is not
actually "displaced" by economic (read efficiency) concerns,
but is only "managed" or "contained" in a way that renders
only specific, desired political outcomes. 291 It is contradictory
because this "displacement" takes an entirely different
mode and function in developing countries than in the
developed West.292 The apparent contradiction is resolved
through an ambiguous usage of the legal institution of rule
of law.
The lack of an agreed definition or content of "Markets"
and the 'Market consensus" is not just semantic inelegance.
It enables a theoretically innocuous move from the description
of the "key aspects" of the "Market consensus" to a set of
institutions that mark the direction of the movement of
developing or transition economies to the Market economy.
288. Minda, supra note 259, at 154.
289. ROBERT HEILBRONER & WILLIAMS MILBURG, THE CRISIS OF VISION IN
MODERN ECONOMIC THOUGHT 127 (1995).
290. Ngugi, supra note 133, at 543-47 (arguing that IFIs use the Rule of
Law Projects to foreclose the possibility of multiple, participatory, and





It is usually stated, for example, in terms of "reducing the
economic roles of government in providing social welfare, in
managing economic activity at the aggregate and sectoral
levels, and in regulating international commerce."
293
However, it is not clear to what extent the "reduction" must
be done to meet the "Market consensus" standards. At the
same time, these institutions are themselves fluid in two
senses. First, the way in which they are defined or applied
in a particular setting structures the political economy of
the reform depending on the specific context. Second, their
lack of clear, specific content means that they can be
applied in differing measures to different situations.
The criticism here, therefore, is that the Market is
heterogeneous in character. 294 It can be instantiated in a
great variety of ways. At the same time, however, advocates
for a particular approach to the Market can claim that a
''consensus" exists about the different characteristics of the
Market by inventing or developing a vocabulary that shapes
the meaning of the different aspects of the market to suit
the "consensus." Such a vocabulary both backgrounds and
foregrounds certain issues in a particular way that results
in the highlighting or erasing; contesting or un-contesting;
putting on the table or removing off the table particular
ideas, doubts, critiques, or aspects of the Market. This way
of framing the meaning of the Market, therefore,
institutionalizes and naturalizes the particular meaning as
a "consensus." It also has the effect of removing the concrete
problems dealt with (e.g., the role and size of the
government, what specific interventions to make, what
exact form of property rights, etc.) from the contested
political (or cultural) realms and recasting them in the
"objective," uncontested world of legal institutions.295
293. ARTHUR MACEWAN, NEO-LIBERALISM OR DEMOCRACY? ECONOMIC
STRATEGY, MARKETS, AND ALTERNATIVES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 4 (1999).
294. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943).
295. Arturo Escobar argued that the professionalization of development (i.e.,
the creation of a discipline called "development" and a profession called
"development experts") played this exact same role in the earlier period of
development discourse. Arturo Escobar writes that:
The concept of professionalization refers mainly to the process that
brings the Third World into the politics of expert knowledge and
Western science in general. This is accomplished through a set of
techniques, strategies, and disciplinary practices that organize the
[Vol. 56
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E. The Model Assumes a Determinate Link Between Legal
Institutions and Economic Performance
Even assuming that it were possible to contrive a
formula that would correlate most efficiently legal
institutions and economic performance, it would not be
possible to determine which institutions or norms would
both institute it and, at the same time, deliver the economic
benefits espoused in such transitions. The reason for this
can be stated in terms of the "legal-economic nexus."
296
Economic actors, whenever it suits them, supply informal,
parallel norms that negotiate and mediate the norms supplied
by the government, whether formally or informally. 297 Since
the economic benefits of the neo-liberal Market reforms are
based on the ability to predict the economic consequences of
the application of knowable rules, the provision of socially-
generated, informal but effective norms thwarts this
process. 298 They also put in doubt the determinacy of the
legal consequences on economic performance. Economic
actors use both the government and the Market system;
both the formal and informal norms to modify the rule of
law for personal gain. This means that property rights
structures, and other economic rewarding systems in the
society are in a "constant state of redefinition, expansion
and contraction. ' 299 It then follows that the determinacy on
which neo-liberal reforms are based is highly problematic.
generation, validation, and diffusion of development knowledge,
including the academic disciplines, methods of research and teaching,
criteria of expertise, and manifold professional practices; in other
words, those mechanisms through which a politics of truth is created
and maintained, through which certain forms of knowledge are given
the status of truth.
ESCOBAR, supra note 62, at 45.
296. See Samuels, supra note 77, at 1557-58.
297. See, e.g., Ngugi, supra note 282 (demonstrating that arguments that
posit a determinate set of consequences as flowing from a change in legal structure
or legal institutions overestimate the determinacy of the economic consequences
that flow from the legal institutions and that even when the posited economic
consequences follow from enactment of specific legal rules or institutions, it is
often not because of the natural implications of the legal regime or laws, but
because of a particular, ideological interpretation assigned to the laws and rules).
298. See Ngugi, supra note 15, at 315-20.
299. Laurence S. Moss, Government, Civil Society, and Property: Restraining
the Legal-Economic Nexus, in THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
GOVERNMENT AND POVERTY, supra note 259, at 177, 178.
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Neo-liberalism is significantly based on the notion that
there is a singular relationship between appropriate
institutions and economic performance. Market prices,
achieved by "getting prices right" through the removal of
Market "distortions" are the mechanism for efficient
exchange, and are the ex post outcome of the interaction
between appropriate institutions and economic conditions.
However, the relationship between Market forces and
formal (and informal) institutions are much more complex,
indeterminate, and capable of unleashing unintended
consequences than this Model accepts. 300 Jean Ensminger
poignantly writes:
The underlying assumption is that institutions directly affect
economic outcomes (distribution and growth), that individuals
realize this, and that they attempt to change institutions to serve
their ends more effectively, whether these ends be ideological or
materialistic. The relative success of different actors in getting the
institutions they want derives in part from their bargaining power
in the pre-existing institutional structure. The outcomes of this
process often have unintended consequences, and by no means
need result in institutional arrangements that better serve the
interests of society as a whole.
30 1
Institutions are made up of formal rules, informal
norms, and the enforcement characteristics of both, and it is
the admixture of rules, norms, and enforcement characteristics
that determines economic performance. 30 2 This points to the
critique that a model that relies on a determinate link
between legal institutions and the economy and social
reality to produce economic development fails to account for
the complex interrelationships between formal and informal
institutions; economic and legal categories. As Warren
300. See, e.g., Ngugi, supra note 15, at 315-20 (arguing that there is no
necessary and determinate relationship between formal legal institutions and
economic development and stating that, "[r]ather than a determinate socio-
cultural sphere interacting with determinate formal legal institutions to
produce determinate economic results, messy and contested socio-cultural
practices interact with ideological and manipulative legal institutions to
produce an indeterminate economic reality at the end of the process").
301. JEAN ENSMINGER, MAKING A MARKET: THE INSTITUTIONAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AN AFRICAN SOCIETY, at xiii (1991).
302. See Douglass C. North, The New Institutional Economics and Third
World Development, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND THIRD WORLD
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 260, at 17.
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Samuels reminds us, "both the market mechanism and the
legal system, as well as the system of moral rules, are
modes of social control and social change. ' ' 303 To be realistic,
the model of economic development must take account of
both.
F. The Post-1980 Conception of the Market Acts as Both an
Analytical Tool and Justification for Policy Preferences
The conception of the Market that came in vogue in the
post-1980 period acts as both a justification and a
prescription of policy preferences at the same time. This
enables the concept to, at different times, empty itself of
content and, at other times, fill itself with particular content.
It can be at the same time a very general and rhetorical
justification for a particular general economic policy and a
detailed concrete proposal for a given programmatic
endeavor. This means that it can be used to justify a wide
variety of proposals at the same place in different times, or
at the same time in different places.
The recent attack by Paul Krugman on U.S. orthodox
economists presents a good example. 304 In his attack,
Krugman accuses Washington policy makers and New York
bankers of double-sidedness in prescribing economic
solutions to the economic slowdown in the United States as
compared to the developing world:
When it comes to the U.S. economy, everyone-including people
who imagine that they have rejected Keynesianism in favor of
some doctrine more congenial to the free market faithful-practice
views the current slowdown in terms of the intellectual framework
John Maynard Keynes created 65 years ago. In particular,
everyone thinks that during a slump what we need is more
spending.
30 5
There is no doubt that the economic recovery plans
advocated for the United States are based on the "Market
model." Government intervention is, however, urged to
encourage more spending by cutting interest rates, lowering
303. Samuels, supra note 271, at 450.





taxes, increase government spending, and so forth. 306 All
these government actions in the Market are seen in the
United States as correcting market imperfections.3 0 7 The
post-1980 conception of the Market does not seem to
prohibit such an argument. This is despite the fact that this
argument seems strikingly similar to arguments that the
Third World countries raised in the early 1980s during the
debt crisis in support of more regulation.3 08 The Third
World governments' arguments, however, were shot down
by the Bretton Woods institutions-which forced them,
instead to undertake severe austerity measures, cut down
government spending especially in social spending and
exchange rate reforms. 30 9
Even more interesting is the fact that even now, using
the same Market model and conception, orthodox economists
who call for more spending to help the United States
recover from the slowdown can, at the same time, call for
the opposite strategy in Argentina and Japan:
But we-by which I mean both policy makers in Washington
and bankers in New York-often seem to prescribe for other
countries the kind of root-canal economics that we would never
tolerate here in the U.S.A.
... [This includes] telling the Japanese that they cannot do
what we do routinely, that is, print however much money it takes
to get the economy moving again.
And then, of course, there is Argentina[,] . .. forced into drastic
spending cuts that will further worsen that slump. It wouldn't be
tolerated here-but bankers in New York tell the Argentines that




308. See supra Part II.
309. For a discussion of the programming and effects of Structural
Adjustment Programs, see U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on
Human Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Effects of Structural
Adjustment Policies on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, U.N. DOC.
E/CN.4/1999/50 (Feb. 24, 1999) (prepared by Fantu Cheru). For effects of
Structural Adjustment Programs in Africa, see generally BETWEEN
LIBERALISATION AND OPPRESSION: THE POLITICS OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN
AFRICA (Thandika Mkandawire & Adebayo Olukoshi eds., 1995).
310. Krugman, supra note 304, at A23.
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G. The Model of the Market is a Self- Validating Logic
The model is hinged on social Darwinist beliefs about
the necessity of intense competition.31 ' It views the Market
as the outcome of processes that, therefore, legitimizes its
outcomes.31 2 However, it becomes a self-validating logic in
which the theory trumps evidence because the concept of
the Market is, at the same time, used to identify and
explain the losers and the winners in the process. Hence,
the Market as a concept, aside from its analytical,
descriptive, and prescriptive uses I pointed to above, is also
used to "make sense of social entities by identifying and
explaining differences between them."313
Since the concept of the Market equates and explains
the losing and the winning in terms of whether the loser or
the winner conformed to the Market characteristics, or
not-or put differently, whether she was adequately
competitive, or not-it equates "winning" with "Market
characteristics," and "losing" with "un-market character-
istics. '31 4 The implication is four-fold. First, this equation
enables all "winners" to be identified with "Market
characteristics," no matter how "un-market-like" they actually
are. For example, large profits by large corporations raked
through mergers, buy-outs, and other techniques aimed at
creating monopolies, and therefore monopoly rents would be
identified in this no-fault system as "winning. ' 31 5 In this
way, the "naturalism" of the Market is assured since it is
inevitably identified with those who turn out on top.
Second, since those who lose are identified as being
unable to conform to the Market or to compete adequately,
it becomes possible to blame them for their "un-market-
like" characteristics. The effect of this strand of argument is
to erase the many inequalities that exist in the Market-
place.31 6 It also detracts from focusing on the socio-economic
311. See Carrier, supra note 12, at 28.
312. See, e.g., INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 146, at 19.
313. Carrier, supra note 12, at 28.
314. See id.
315. See id.
316. See generally James Thuo Gathii, Good Governance as a Counter
Insurgency Agenda to Oppositional and Transformative Social Projects in
International Law, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 107 (1999).
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conditions (as reflected in existing legal arrangements)
creating the unequal positions. Instead, it focuses on the
end-result situation, using it to justify the socio-economic
situation that produced it.
Third, such a view that identifies losers with "weak,"
"unfit," "deviant," or "undesirable" characteristics that cannot
survive market competition, also legitimates the existing
social relations, and militates attempts to change them
through progressive actions. James Carrier captures this
pernicious use of the market:
For individuals, winners are autonomous, rational and calculating;
losers are dependent, muddled and cannot defer gratification ....
[As a result,] members of the dominated classes [the losers] are
driven by necessity precisely because they lack the resources that
enable members of the dominant classes, the winners, to distance
themselves from their immediate situation .... Such a view not
only justifies the success of the winners, it also motivates (or at
least legitimates) policies that weaken the position of the
individuals who are losers. Such policies include attacks on
welfare, which is said to decrease the market fitness of the
unemployed, those who have failed to find a buyer for their labour,
by encouraging dependency and discouraging initiative, calculation
and self-reliance .... 317
Fourth, aside from blaming the "losers," and justifying
and legitimating the existing socio-economic relations, this
view actually has an effect of validating itself. This is
because, by identifying those who "lose" as "unfit" and
"undesirable," it seeks to put pressure on them to alter their
behavior to conform more to the "Market." As such, it acts
as a disciplining tool as well. To the extent that it actually
succeeds in effecting these behavioral changes in the
individuals, firms, or groups, it actually becomes a self-
validating logic-a self-fulfilling model. 318 It is actually self-
fulfilling in two senses. First, by equating the "winners"
with Market characteristics, it ensures that the "moral
superiority" of the Market as a postulate always trumps
over any evidence to the contrary. Second, by disciplining
the society to adhere to the 'Market" by pressuring "losers"
317. Carrier, supra note 12, at 28-29 (citation omitted).
318. See James Thuo Gathii, Retelling Good Governance Narratives on
Africa's Economic and Political Predicaments: Continuities and Discontinuities
in Legal Outcomes Between Markets and States, 45 VILL. L. REV. 971 (2000).
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to adhere to the Market forces rather than seek to challenge
its oppressive results, it helps to actually reconfigure power
relations, and redistribute wealth in ways that correspond
to its image of the world.
A good example of this phenomenon in practice is in the
good governance projects of international development
agencies in sub-Saharan Africa. As James Gathii argues,
"[a]n important premise of the good governance agenda
seems to be that economic regulation in favor of social
justice is a perverse incentive that encourages lazy citizenry
and rundown economies. '319 Since the regulatory controls
targeted are those aimed at achieving social justice and
more egalitarian distribution of resources, the good
governance projects associate these egalitarian aspects of
regulation with "pervasion." This is because such programs
are aimed at assisting those who "lose" out in the market.
Therefore, "[g]ood governance accounts spin out narratives
of individual responsibility to replace what they argue to be
the dependent mentality of Sub-Saharan African citizens."320
In an earlier era, what is now known as "The Gilded
Age," a similar style of reasoning-also known as Social
Darwinism interpreted using a conservative lens-was used
to justify the extremes of poverty and wealth in the United
States and attack social welfare legislation, and contract
interpretation that took the concept of freedom of contract
to the extreme.32 1 The argument was formulated along
Herbert Spencer's famous aphorism: survival for the
fittest.322 It was an attempt to apply Darwin's theories of
natural selection to the social sphere. 323 The economic elites
319. Id. at 972.
320. Id.
321. See generally HERBERT SPENCER, THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE (Caxton
Printers 1954) (1892); HERBERT SPENCER, THE PROPER SPHERE OF GOVERNMENT
(1843). For a good historical account of this period, see ATIYAH, supra note 25; 2
GEORGE BROWN TINDALL, AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 780-836 (1984).
322. 1 HERBERT SPENCER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY 50 (1906).
323. Troy Duster, Lessons From History: Why Race and Ethnicity Have
Played a Major Role in Biomedical Research, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 487, 490
(2006) ("Herbert Spencer was not focusing his ideas on the animal kingdom, but
on social life, human behavior, and evolutionary differences among humans.");
see also Chantal Thomas, Globalization and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 33
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1451, 1452-53 (2000) (discussing the policy implications of
laissez-fairism on the governmental response to the casualties of globalization).
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of the time, mainly industrialists, used Spencer's argument
about survival for the fittest to provide justification for the
argument that their accumulation of wealth was in fact the
result of an inviolable natural law leading (eventually) to
greater good for all. 324 Any attempt to interfere with or
mitigate its results, using social welfare legislation, they
warned, could only prevent society from advancing. Thus,
they were hostile toward the expansion of the welfare state
since this would only create conditions in which the "unfit"
would be artificially maintained longer than they would
survive naturally:
Those who were fittest, that is, toughest, most able, most
enterprising, would survive; the weak would, if not physically
perish, assuredly fail. This was an inexorable scientific process.
Nothing the government or anyone else could do would arrest it in
the long run; but for the government to interfere with the process
would be disastrous in the short run for it would ensure a longer
period of survival of the unfit.
3 25
Kenneth Galbraith wrote of this argument:
Such was the service of economics to early capitalism. And such
service has continued. Toward the end of the last century, in what
has now come down to us as the Gilded Age, Herbert Spencer
avowed the economic and social doctrine of the survival of the
fittest-it is to him and not to Darwin that we owe those words.
Though British, Spencer was a figure of heroic proportions in the
United States, as were his disciples. His most distinguished
acolyte, William Graham Sumner of Yale, served the gilded
constituency in remarkable explicit language: "The millionaires
are a product of natural selection .... They may fairly be regarded
as the naturally selected agents of society for certain work. They
get high wages and live in luxury, but the bargain is a good one for
324. See Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral
Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 493 (2005) ("In Spencer's hands, Darwin's
biology was warped and twisted to serve as justification for Gilded Age
capitalism and individualism. It was for this reason that Spencer's ideas
became immensely popular among United States industrialists, such as John D.
Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie. Darwin was invoked to buttress an already
existing conservative outlook-that nature would ensure that the best
competitors would win competitive situations-and to give the supposed force of
natural law to an already rampant class struggle.") (footnotes omitted).




VIII. SHIFTS IN THE MEANING OF THE MARKET AND THE
RETURN OF LOCHNERISM IN DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE
So far, this Article has demonstrated how the pre-1980
notions of the role of the state and the meaning of the Market
were constructed in the development discourse. The Article
traced the antecedents of the notions of the "developmental
state" in the Third World that supported strategic regimes
such as import substitution industrialization. 327 The notion
of the "developmental state" registered the claim or
assumption that the predominant objective of governments
in the Third World was development, "involving particularly
a change in the quality and quantity of resources such that
the productivity of human effort is raised."328 Since this
change required the orientation of allocation of resources
around structural change, a more pervasive role for the
state in the economy than that traditionally assumed by
neo-classical economists was envisaged.329
However, in the post-1980 period, the importance of
structural orientation of allocation of resources as the
justification of departure from traditional neo-classical
theorization about the workings of the Market, was over-
shadowed by the more "purist" form of free trade.330 This
"purist" version emphasizes the neo-classical assumption
that the most beneficial international exchange of
commodities occurs between private individuals or firms of
different countries operating in an atmosphere of free
private competitive enterprise. This implies no government
interference, economically rational behavior, a perfectly, or
near-perfectly, competitive market for each market and
326. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE CULTURE OF CONTENTMENT 80-81
(1992) (footnote omitted).
327. See supra Part II.
328. George Powell, Use of Commercial Policies for Purposes of Economic
Development with Respect to Selected Underdeveloped Countries 8 (1961)
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Illinois) (on file with author).
329. See id.
330. See supra Part III.
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factor of production, and so forth. 331 However, these
assumptions and/or requirements of "free trade" in this"purist" version are no more satisfied today in the Third
World as they were in the pre-1980 period. However, by
using key aspects in the debate like privatization, the
development discourse was able to change its focus from
those aspects that made necessary the notion of the
"developmental state."
We could rethink the shift that took place around 1980
in terms of drawing and redrawing an axis between the
Market and the state. The Article demonstrated that the
meaning of the Market, and the construction of the role of
the state vis-a-vis that of the Market in the economy are
facilitated by shifting this axis.
In a way, students of legal ideas and globalization
would be quick to associate the two meanings of the Market
(in the pre- and post-1980 periods) with two dominant ideas
that dominated legal theory in the period from 1850 to 1900
and 1900-1950 respectively.332 If one thinks of the meanings
of the Market as supported by particular legal ideals,
theories, concepts, techniques, legal instruments, and global
images, the pre- and post-1980 meanings of the Market as
sketched out in this Article roughly correspond with the two
dominant ideas in these two periods. These two ideas are
the Classical Legal Thought (CLT) in the former period and
the anti-formal and social ideas about law in the latter period.
Classical legal thought was characterized by a rhetoric that
viewed the law as coming from a transcendent source, as if it
existed apart from the courts and legislatures that formulate its
rules. This rhetoric described private legal rights and obligations
as self-defining and self-executing: courts had only to apply a body
of determinate rules to a private legal dispute.
333
In this conception, therefore, "the job of the state was to
define rights (expansively), allow contracts of adhesion, and
331. See supra Part III.
332. This periodization is Duncan Kennedy's. Kennedy, Two Globalizations,
supra note 184.
333. Herbert Hovenkamp, University of Iowa Ben V. and Dorothy Willie
Distinguished Professor of Law, A Presidential Lecture: The Mind and Heart of




then get out of the picture, secure in the knowledge that it
was not regulating."334 The outcome of this conception of
the law was the exaltation of private ordering-private
bargaining in unregulated markets. In the resolution of a
private legal dispute, such as a contract case or a
disagreement about ownership of property, the state was
regarded not as "policy maker" but only as arbitrator of
preexisting rights. 335
Since CLT assumed that the law was apolitical,
determinate, objective, and neutral, it retained a conception
of law as static, or permanent. 336 Rules had to be applied to
new situations, but they seldom needed to be rewritten.
This was despite the fact that the nineteenth century was a
period of rapid economic and social change. In this way,
CLT provided rationale that ensured legitimacy of the
extant distribution of society's resources. 337
334. James Boyle, A Non-Delegation Doctrine for the Digital Age, 50 DUKE
L.J. 5, 16 (2000).
335. CLT did, of course, concede that at times law was obviously tied to
state policy making. The response to this was for CLT to conceptually
distinguish between "private" law and "public" law. In this enterprise, CLT
borrowed from William Blackstone, the important eighteenth-century writer on
the common law, a sharp distinction between private law and public law. In
private law the state administered independently established rules, but in
public law it made the rules. See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND
FALL OF CLAssIcAL LEGAL THOUGHT 1850-1940 (1998); Duncan Kennedy, The
Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205 (1979). Prof.
Kennedy's central argument is that CLT divided the world into contrasting
power-pairs, such as public/private and federal/state, with highly determinate
interrelationships, and that a court's decision to locate a litigant within one half
of a power-pair or the other determines the outcome of cases.
336. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Un-Making Law: The Classical Revival In
The Common Law, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) ("At the end of the
Nineteenth Century, classical legal thought envisioned a highly systematic body
of law through which courts could mechanically apply abstract legal concepts to
reach determinate results, producing limited liability in contract and tort law
and expansive property rights."); Joseph William Singer, The Player and the
Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1984) ("Those of us
associated with Critical Legal Studies believe that law is not apolitical and
objective: Lawyers, judges, and scholars make highly controversial political
choices, but use the ideology of legal reasoning to make our institutions appear
natural and our rules appear neutral.").
337. The most illustrative example given in this regard is Langdell's first
case book on contract. In it, Langdell presented legal rules as absolutely
ahistorical. He presented contract law as an essentially timeless enterprise.
There is no explicit acknowledgement that the law tracked economic or political
policy or doctrine; indeed, there was little acknowledgement that the law
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"Both judges and legal scholars formulated the
taxonomic categories based on previous legal precedents
and then applied these categories, without much explanation
or interpretation, to resolve new disputes. Classical legal
thinkers did not explore the ways in which human nature
influenced the construction of the taxonomies they drew. ' 338
Thus, the political orientation that CLT shared
was libertarian, committed to a rather minimal state that left as
much scope as possible for citizens to exercise their individual
liberty in the marketplace, where they could bargain, contract, and
exchange. Libertarianism, like other political philosophies, has at
least an implicit conception of human nature, as evidenced by its
commitments to ownership and exchange, the activities it takes to
be distinctively human and centrally important to human
welfare.
33 9
This is what heralded the rise of Lochnerism in the United
States. Under CLT, therefore, a social legislation enacting
maximum-hours law for bakers could be invalidated on the
grounds that it unconstitutionally interfered with the
freedom of contract. 340 The CLT was heavily influenced by
German ideas about law, and the desire by legal jurists to
elevate the law to the status of a natural science. 341
However, as Morton Horwitz argues, the centralization
of the American economy-with the accompanying problems
of urbanization, immigration, industrialism, and polarization
of economic classes-led to a gradual reexamination of
changed at all over time. C. C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS (1871).
338. Heidi Li Feldman, Foreword: Law, Psychology, and the Emotions, 74
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1423, 1424 (2000).
339. Id. at 1425.
340. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Steinfeld wrote that the right
of men to contract for labor superseded land ownership as a defining element of
political citizenship. By the end of the nineteenth century a linguistic turn-
about had occurred. Many men and the businesses they owned not only claimed
that the right to contract for labor was a sine qua non of political citizenship,
but that the right to contract was also central to the meaning of property itself.
Interference with the right to contract became a vehicle for arguing that the
Constitution's provision barring governments from depriving persons of
property without due process of law was violated. In short, the right to contract
for labor itself came to be thought of as property. Robert J. Steinfeld, Property
and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1989).
341. See Kennedy, Two Globalizations, supra note 184, at 638-41.
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Classical Legal Thought, particularly the bias in legal
orthodoxy against redistribution of wealth.342 Horwitz
describes how economic and, ultimately, social changes
brought about by the First World War put irresistible
pressure on courts and legal scholars to bring
jurisprudential thought into closer touch with America's
rapidly changing society. 34
3
According to Duncan Kennedy, the legal thought that
staged the eventually fatal attack on the CLT, derived its
inspiration from French legal writers like Saleilles, Duguit,
Geny, and Lambert.344 This school of thought was "anti-
formalist" in opposition to the formal, taxonomic deductive
logic of CLT, and "social" in opposition to the. highly
individualistic focus of CLT. 345 As opposed to the singular,
hierarchical formalist ideal of the law in the CLT, the anti-
formalist ideas were that in every legal system there is a
plurality of normative orders-and that the law ought to
evolve to reflect the increasing and inevitable inter-
dependencies between much less individualistic, much more
social and altruistic elements. The conclusion is then that
the law ought to reflect the social functions of the legal order.
346
Since this vision of the legal system questioned the"exaltation of the private ordering" it became emblematic
with its distrust of the Market, and its faith that the
government agency, whose salaried officials did not profit
from their decisions, could regulate the economy better.
3 47
In the United States, for example, supporters of this school
of thought supported the New Deal, which, by definition,
was erecting the modern administrative state in order to
remove great parts of the economy from free market
control. 348 By privileging the "social," the anti-formalists
also hoped to subordinate concerns for the efficient use of
resources to other "social" values such as egalitarianism
and redistribution. In the United States and other Northern
342. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-
1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1977).
343. Id.
344. Kennedy, Two Globalizations, supra note 184, at 648-49.
345. See id. at 648-51.
346. See id. at 651-52.




countries, one may plausibly say that this mode of thinking
remained in vogue effectively until the early 1980s. 349
As would probably be clear by now, the meaning of the
Market associated with the post-1980 "Market-oriented"
reforms in the development discourse tallies closely with
the conception of the economic image of CLT in many
material respects. At the same time, the idea of the Market
which prevailed in the development discourse in the pre-
1980 period involved the legal ideal of solidarity, plural
legal systems that take account of plural legal orders, and
the privileging the social functions of the Market as a
measure to avoid socially irrational markets. 350
It would therefore appear that the idea of the Market in
the pre-1980 development discourse roughly corresponds
with ideas about the "social" that are associated with the
French anti-formalist school.351 The dominant mode of legal
thought that this method uses is a combination of a critique
of deduction and a severe critique of the excessive
individualism of CLT coupled with an anti-formalist ideal of
the "social" in regulating the marketplace. 352 What we can
argue from this striking correspondence of ideas is that
whereas these ideas of the anti-formalist "social" conception
of law lost its dominance in legal theory in the 1950s-and
was replaced by the American "pragmatic" ideal 353-its
influence continued to be important to the development
discourse and the construction of the Market in development
discourse until around 1980.35 4 Hence, as legal theorists
would notice here, the influence of the French anti-
formalists and their notion of the "social" conception of law,
349. However, Duncan Kennedy argues that a "third" wave of globalization
started in the 1950s and is still under way. It is marked by pragmatism as
opposed to anti-formalism. Id. at 675-78.
350. Witness, for example, the arguments about "cultural rigidities" that
justified more pervasive state role in the economy in developing countries. See
supra Part VI. The argument here was that due to "cultural rigidities" markets,
if left alone, are likely to produce socially irrational outcomes.
351. See generally Kennedy, Two Globalizations, supra note 184.
352. See id.
353. See id. at 671-78 (describing the critiques of the "social" conceptions of
law, and its ultimate replacement circa 1950 by a new wave of globalization
that defined itself less by legal consciousness, and more by pragmatic legal
reforms).
354. See supra Part III.
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legal institutions, and Market regulation dominated
thinking in development discourse well beyond the "sell-by"
date that it is given by most legal theorists. 355 Most legal
theorists put the date 1950 as the year marking the end of
the dominance of the French anti-formalist ideas.356
In the post-1980 period, however, what took over the
discourse framing the meaning of the Market in the
development discourse, was not the "pragmatic" ideal that
in the legal field took over from the French anti-formalist
"social" ideal in the 1950s.357 Instead, in the development
discourse, at least the discourse framing the definition of
the Market, there was a stunning reemergence of CLT that
dominated the legal field in the period between 1850 and
1950. So, like in the CLT period, once again, in the post-
1980 period, the ideas that became important in the
definition of the Market and the framing of the Market
discourse were (i) the legal ideal of freedom; (ii) the
reemergence of the individual and autonomy as the central
concept in economic relations; and (iii) the "Free market" as
the economic ideal-image.
As noted above, in legal thought generally, the anti-
formalist "social" ideal was replaced by the essentially
American "pragmatic" ideal that comprehended the
pragmatically regulated market as its economic image. 358
However, in the post-1980 Market discourse in development
studies, the debates very much returned to the more
classical view emphasizing the efficiency and robustness of
private markets, and the many imperfections of public
processes. 359 At the same time, however, these "core" ideas
of CLT are supplemented by highly sophisticated ideas that
are borrowed from the successor of the anti-formalist
"social" ideal namely, the "pragmatic" ideas that have been
ascendant in legal theory in the period after 1950. As
Duncan Kennedy has shown, the three "core" ideas of CLT
that have reemerged in the framing discourse that defines
the meaning of the Market in the development discourse,
355. See Kennedy, Two Globalizations, supra note 184, at 671-78 (putting
the decline of the influence of the "social" as starting around 1950).
356. See, e.g., id.
357. See id.
358. See supra note 350 and accompanying text.
359. See supra Part IV.
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are supplemented by the following ideas that are dominant
in the present "pragmatic" mode of theorization: (i) the idea
of rights-bearing individual (as opposed to the diadic
private relationship of the CLT);360 (ii) the legal technique
of balancing of conflicting considerations; 36 1 and (iii) the
legal agency of the judge and activist civil society. 362
This combination of the "core" elements of CLT with
these aspects of the "pragmatic" ideal are extremely crucial
for the success of the particular construction of the Market
that emerged in the post-1980 period as chronicled in this
Article. This is because in retaining the "core" elements of
CLT, this conflation successfully creates the "foundational"
image that that the absence of government interference in
the private sector can succeed in being neutral between
competing conceptions of the public good. The effect is that
it destabilizes arguments that are routinely staged as either
on the left (redistributive) side or the right (status quo).
This is because it retains the basic elements of the ideal
CLT conceptions of the economy and legal institutions. This
post-1980 Market discourse then combines these retained
CLT core with sophisticated, pragmatic "realistic" and, at
times seeming progressive ideas about the individual and
the society and the idea of rights that at once gives the
emancipatory illusion and the social promise of collective
prosperity. In this scenario, it became difficult for those in
the left who had held on to the ideas of the French anti-
formalists galvanized around the idea of the "social" to
respond to the arguments centered on the definition of the
Market churned out by the right and their framing of the
discourse that now defines the Market and directs the
policies of international financial institutions.
The CLT is more wedded to the idea of "free market" as
the unregulated sphere-masking the fact that the state
plays a crucial role in establishing the Market. 363 On the
other hand, the pragmatic mode relies on the notion that
one needs to "draw[ ] on a range of different disciplines and
methods in an intuitive effort to solve problems and
360. Kennedy, Two Globalizations, supra note 184, at 632.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. See supra Part VIII.
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exercise good judgment."364 The difficulty is that the
retention (or resurrection) of the ideal-representation of the
Free Market economic ideal in the meaning of the Market is
combined with the major pragmatic intuition that "doing
law" is a "practical matter of balancing, negotiating and
managing competing political visions, ideals and
outcomes. ' 36 5 Since the "core" of CLT as outlined above in
the form of retention of ideal-representation of the Market
continues to direct the definition of the Market and the
prescriptions for its establishment and operationalization,
the exercise of balancing, negotiating and managing
competing political visions, ideals and outcomes come as
one that is already seriously circumscribed. This is because,
as aforesaid, the basic "core" of the CLT ideal of the Free
Market as the economic image is retained and directs the
balancing act in the "pragmatic" ideal of the current era.
There are two things that we can carry away from this
pre-1980 Market conception/anti-formalist "social" and
post-1980 Market conceptionlCLT discussion. First, the
practical and sobering message is the realization that from
the ideas and strategies of the "free marketers" in the post-
1980 period in organizing their support for the idea if the
"market" in the development discourse involves a combination
of the "core" ideals and ideas of CLT with the more
sophisticated, pragmatic ideas of the present "pragmatic"
moment. By combining ideal-type representations and
evaluative descriptions of the Market (derived from CLT)
with evaluative prescriptions of its operationalization
(based on the dominant "pragmatic" ideal), it becomes
difficult to contest their major points effectively. Hence,
most critiques either focus merely on de-centering the ideal-
type representation of the market or displacing the
evaluative policy prescriptions of the model, leaving an
altogether unconvincing critique of the definition of the
market. The tendency is then to dismiss such critiques of
the Market conception as either naive, utopian or mistaken.
The second message we can take away from this
discussion is the theoretical point that the "pragmatic"
moment has never quite arrived in the development
364. David Kennedy, The Methods and the Politics, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL
STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 345, 347 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick
Munday eds., 2003).
365. Id. at 348.
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discourse. The discourse is dominated by a mode of thought
that combines CLT ideas with the "pragmatic" ideal
strategically in mobilizing the meaning of the Market that
is preferred. It is not clear what the exact impact this
theoretical insight would have-but it is easy to imagine
that it would influence critics of the ideas of "free markets"
in the ways that they organize their materials and
arguments about the definition and operationalization of
the Market in the development discourse.
CONCLUSION
Market economies exist in a state of perpetual tension
between the freedoms conferred by the private ownership of
productive property and the need to impose communal
limits on the exercise of those freedoms. This Article has
demonstrated that regulation and intervention is a feature
of all economies whether they rely on market capitalism or
central planning to allocate resources. Therefore, contrary
to the popular representation in the development discourse,
regulation is not antithetical to capitalism; it is the
hallmark of capitalism:
The impulse to acquisition has in itself nothing to, do with
capitalism . . . Capitalism may even be identical with the
restraint, or at least a rational tempering, of this irrational
impulse .... The universal reign of absolute unscrupulousness in
the pursuit of selfish interests has been a specific characteristic of
precisely those countries whose bourgeois-capitalistic development...
has remained backward.
366
Yet regulation is, by definition, a power struggle.
Various economic actors either lose or gain constantly
according to the shifts in market conditions and competitive
pressures. The role of the government in regulating-in
choosing the framework and instruments of regulation-
determines the winners and losers. It also determines the
particular responses that individual firms take. But, to
describe the general framework chosen or the specific
regulation elected as "Market-oriented" or "central-
366. Michael Moran, Investor Protection and the Culture of Capitalism, in
CAPITALISM, CULTURE, AND ECONOMIC REGULATION 49, 50 (Leigh Hancher &
Michael Moran eds., 1989) (citing MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE




planning" is a function, not of the governmental activity per
se, but of the framing discourse in sway at a given time. As
the discourse changes, the content of a given paradigm changes
and the meaning shifts. This makes such paradigms not
just on-going descriptions of concrete goings-on in the society,
but a normative intellectual exercise aimed at devising
prescriptions as well. As a concept, thus, the Market
represents a great variety of specific approaches about the
relationship between various participants in the market
place-even whether some are legitimate actors or not.367
The fact that the concept of the "Market" can be both
descriptive and evaluative makes the concept "user-friendly."
It can mean different things to different people at different
times. Yet, it turns out that this plasticity of the Market has
been extremely useful for the neo-liberal logic. The bridge
between the meaning and content of the market and the
concrete proposals of how to effectuate it under neo-liberalism,
is filled by legal institutions. 368 These legal institutions,
imbued by "objective" and "neutral" standards, eventually
become both the means and the end of the reform. 369
Hence, while the market has no agreed definition or
content, it reproduces the dilemma in development discourse
generally. The open-endedness of the market makes it
inescapably normative-with different possible meanings,
each with even more ramifications at different times. The
real danger in all these is that the difference between
means and ends can be obfuscated or obliterated-making
the discourse self-referential. In this way, both neo-liberalism
and developmentalism merely reproduce the strategy and
results of Cartesian rationality. The same rationality lies at
the heart of modernization. The rationality reveals the telos
of development-a logic that simultaneously lures everyone
"forward" (by the confidence of its ability to deliver superior
results universally)-while transmuting all alternative
visions rooted in local knowledge as going "backwards. 3 70
367. See generally DAVID E. APTER, RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT: MODERNIZATION,
DEPENDENCY, AND POSTMODERN POLITICS (1987).
368. See Ngugi, supra note 133.
369. See id.
370. Fr6d~rique Apffel-Marglin, Introduction: Rationality and the World, in
DECOLONIZING KNOWLEDGE: FROM DEVELOPMENT TO DIALOGUE 1, 2 (Fr~d6rique
Apffel-Marglin & Stephen A. Marglin eds., 1999).
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